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ABSTRACT 
  Within the past decade, U.S. interior immigration enforcement has 
shifted away from the street and into the jailhouse. The rationale behind 
jailhouse screening is to target enforcement efforts on those who fall 
within federal removal priorities. This Article shows how a program 
undertaken with the stated aim of targeting immigration enforcement 
has had precisely the opposite effect: it has massively expanded the 
reach of immigration enforcement and created extended carceral 
treatment within the criminal justice system based on suspected 
immigration status. This approach, in turn, leads to removals that lack 
adequate process, are inaccurate, or that reflect underlying racial biases 
in criminal arrests. Jailhouse immigration screening resuscitates what 
is experienced as a punitive model of immigration enforcement but 
without the procedural protections that ought to accompany the 
criminal process. This approach imposes an enormous cost on racial 
minorities disproportionately subject to low-level arrest, and it cuts 
against immigration enforcement officials’ stated aim of targeting 
immigration enforcement. By laying bare how jailhouse screening 
extends the impact of criminal arrest, undermines due process, and 
magnifies racial disparities, this Article makes the case for uncoupling 
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immigration screening from the jailhouse altogether. Barring that 
approach, arrested individuals are entitled to greater front-end 
procedural protections, including neutral review of immigration 
detainers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, interior immigration enforcement in the United 
States has undergone a radical transformation. Today, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) picks up far more 
people from prisons and jails than from all other settings combined.1 
 
 1.  In fiscal year 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reported a total of 
158,581 administrative arrests, of which 40,536 occurred “at-large.” U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 2, 6 fig.3 
(2018), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RF3U-GX42]. Approximately three times as many people were arrested from a custodial criminal 
setting than from all other contexts—such as workplaces or street stops—combined. Id. at 5. 
These figures are likely underinclusive. According to ICE, in 2017 the number of at-large arrests 
increased by more than 10,000 from the prior year, primarily concentrated in sanctuary 
jurisdictions that would not comply with detainers, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL 
YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 6 (2017), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf [https://
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Since 2013, every arrested individual in the United States has been 
subject to automatic immigration screening.2 Through the Secure 
Communities program, immigration enforcement officials compare the 
fingerprints of every arrested individual against various Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) databases to check for removability.3 
Secure Communities is arguably the most important immigration 
legacy of the Obama administration.4 It has spawned an enormous 
bureaucracy devoted to screening immigration status within the U.S. 
jailhouse. 
The stated aim of jailhouse screening is to target immigration 
enforcement in accordance with high-level federal removal priorities. 
As Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez detail, the President 
largely sets the agenda for removals from within the United States.5 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) renders a massive 
population—approximately eleven million noncitizens—“deportable 
at the option of the President.”6 At the same time, DHS removes less 
than 5 percent of the total undocumented population in any given 
 
perma.cc/G2SV-CAGE], indicating that many of these “at-large” arrests were of people likely 
identified while in prison or jail.  
 2.  Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (last updated Feb. 9, 2021), 
https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities [https://perma.cc/8PX8-87U6] (stating that the program 
was implemented nationwide on January 22, 2013). Secure Communities began a gradual roll-out 
process in limited jurisdictions starting in 2008. Id. By “arrest” this Article refers to those who 
undergo the process of custodial criminal arrest—meaning arrests where people are taken to the 
precinct, fingerprinted, and booked. 
 3.  Id.; see also Expert Report of John Amaya at 5–7, Creedle v. Miami-Dade County, 349 
F. Supp. 3d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (No. 1:17-cv-22477) [hereinafter Amaya Report] (“There is no 
single, unified database that underlies the issuance of detainers . . . [but rather] a patchwork of 
different systems maintained by different components of the Department of Homeland Security, 
including ICE, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Service[s].”).  
 4.  See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 
125 YALE L.J. 104, 137 (2015) [hereinafter Cox & Rodríguez, Immigration Law Redux] 
(describing Secure Communities as a “centerpiece” of the Obama administration’s immigration 
enforcement strategy); see also Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 87, 87 (2013) (describing Secure Communities as integrating local police into federal 
immigration enforcement “on a scale never seen before in American history”).  
 5.  Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE 
L.J. 458, 463 (2009) [hereinafter Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law]. 
 6.  Id.; Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Total Level Dips to 
Lowest Level in a Decade, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/
hispanic/2018/11/27/u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-total-dips-to-lowest-level-in-a-decade [https://
perma.cc/MB7G-AV3Q]. 
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year.7 The government presents jailhouse screening as a “simple and 
common-sense way to carry out ICE’s enforcement priorities.”8 
“[F]elons, not families,” is how President Barack Obama described 
those priorities.9 Jailhouse screening is thought to give immigration 
enforcement officials a way to gather information about arrested 
individuals and to use that information to implement removals in 
accordance with federal priorities. For instance, federal immigration 
officials can concentrate on noncitizens who pose “public safety and 
national security threats.”10 This approach, in turn, has the effect of 
shielding long-term noncitizens who do not fall within removal 
priorities from deportation.11  
This Article shows how a program developed with the stated aim 
of targeting immigration enforcement has massively expanded its 
reach, magnified the socioracial disparities underlying criminal arrests, 
and ultimately created new systemic risks of removing longtime 
residents. Secure Communities has generated debates regarding the 
scope of executive power12 and about immigration federalism, 
 
 7.  Table 39. Aliens Removed or Returned: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2019/
table39 [https://perma.cc/RJ6H-L4WE]; cf. Eisha Jain, The Interior Structure of Immigration 
Enforcement, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1464–65 (2019) (noting that interior immigration policies 
affect a population that is comprised predominantly of long-term residents). 
 8.  Secure Communities, supra note 2.  
 9.  Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Nov. 
20, 2014), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201400877/pdf/DCPD-201400877.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/53YW-AQ2D]. Obama’s language may have been intended to signal a focus on 
crime control, but its meaning is unclear, given that those convicted of felonies are of course also 
part of families. See Rebecca Sharpless, “Immigrants Are Not Criminals”: Respectability, 
Immigration Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691, 703 (2016) (criticizing the 
“‘felons, not families’ sound bite regarding deportation policy [as] reflect[ing] a simplistic, binary 
approach that renders invisible those who simultaneously occupy both categories”). 
 10.  Secure Communities, supra note 2. 
 11.  Remarks by the President to the Nation on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT 
BARACK OBAMA (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:01 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/6CR8-HFL5] 
(describing the need, given the failure of comprehensive immigration reform, to provide a way 
for long-term unauthorized migrants to participate in American society without fear of 
deportation); see also Cox & Rodríguez, Immigration Law Redux, supra note 4, at 186 (describing 
an immigration agency memoranda for prosecutorial discretion under the Obama administration 
as making “a kind of political promise to shift the brunt of the enforcement system away from 
[immigration] status violators and toward more serious offenders,” although the memoranda 
never promised immunity from enforcement for any group). 
 12.  See Cox & Rodríguez, Immigration Law Redux, supra note 4, at 135–37 (describing 
Secure Communities as a legitimate example of executive power in immigration enforcement).  
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particularly through “sanctuary” or noncooperation policies.13 But thus 
far, the legal institution of the jailhouse itself has received relatively 
little attention. This Article argues that we cannot understand the work 
that immigration screening is doing without recognizing its structural 
impact within the jailhouse itself.14 Jailhouse screening is not 
functioning as a targeted model of immigration enforcement. Rather, 
it is functioning as a punitive model. It subjects jailed individuals to 
extended carceral treatment within the criminal justice system because 
of suspected civil immigration violations.  
Conceptualizing jailhouse immigration screening as targeted 
misapprehends how the jailhouse expands the reach of immigration 
law. Before the rollout of Secure Communities, most residents would 
encounter immigration officials only if they traveled overseas. That 
world is gone. Today, one out of every three adults will be arrested by 
 
 13.  Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary 
Cities After Secure Communities, 9 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 14 (2016); Trevor George Gardner, 
Immigrant Sanctuary as the “Old Normal”: A Brief History of Police Federalism, 119 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 8–9 (2019) (arguing that “subfederal resistance movements like immigrant sanctuary [are] 
the ‘old normal,’ in sync with the customary relationship between the federal government and the 
neighborhood police department”); Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary 
Networks, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1214 (2019) (arguing that “current public and private 
sanctuaries are best understood as part of a broader system of legal resistance to the federal 
enforcement regime”). 
 14.  This Article contributes to a body of related scholarship that focuses on the impact of 
immigration enforcement on nonfederal criminal cases. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant 
Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245, 245 (2016) [hereinafter Eagly, 
Immigrant Protective Policies] (discussing how “prosecutor offices, city police departments, and 
county sheriffs in four large counties in California: Alameda, Los Angeles, Santa Clara, and 
Ventura” treat immigration consequences of criminal arrests and convictions); see also Jason A. 
Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 
1755 (2013) (focusing on “[t]he particular crisis facing noncitizens arrested for petty offenses”); 
Jennifer M. Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 709, 744 (2015) (noting 
that criminal law intersects with immigration law “in ways that make noncitizens uniquely 
vulnerable to incarceration”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the 
Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 336–44 [hereinafter 
Chacón, Whose Community Shield?] (describing the impact of gang-based removals on domestic 
crime control); Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration 
Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1459 (2011) (highlighting the role that 
immigration status plays “at almost every stage of the criminal process”); Stephen Lee, De Facto 
Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 555 (2013) (discussing how state and local 
prosecutors negotiate immigration consequences through plea bargaining).  
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the age of twenty-three;15 the ratio is higher for Black and Latino men.16 
Immigration screening necessarily attaches to the engine of 
misdemeanor arrests, which constitute the vast majority of arrests in 
the United States every year.17 Misdemeanors already give police 
enormous discretion to target common behavior that is too often 
detached from principles of moral culpability.18 By relying on criminal 
arrest, immigration enforcement necessarily absorbs the selection 
biases underlying domestic policing decisions.  
The targeted model obscures how jailhouse immigration screening 
magnifies the impact of a low-level criminal arrest. Contrary to the 
government’s assumption that immigration enforcement occurs 
“behind the scenes” of an arrest,19 jailhouse immigration screening has 
an immediate impact on the criminal justice process. It leads to the 
denial of bail or harsher plea proffers.20 This approach undermines the 
significance of a seminal 1896 decision, Wong Wing v. United States,21 
which held that noncitizens cannot be punished for civil immigration 
violations.22 Wong Wing involved formal punishment; the defendants 
 
 15.  Robert Brame, Michael G. Turner, Raymond Paternoster & Shawn D. Bushway, 
Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 
(2012).  
 16.  One study found significantly higher arrest rates for Black and Latino men. Robert 
Brame, Shawn D. Bushway, Ray Paternoster & Michael G. Turner, Demographic Patterns of 
Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014) 
(estimating, based on a limited sample size, that 49 percent of Black men and 44 percent of Latino 
men will be arrested by the age of twenty-three). Racial disparities in arrest rates have also been 
documented in particular contexts, such as marijuana arrests. See, e.g., Benjamin Mueller, Using 
Data To Make Sense of a Racial Disparity in NYC Marijuana Arrests, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/insider/data-marijuana-arrests-racial-disparity.html [https://
perma.cc/S6DD-52N9] (“In the first three months of [2018], 89 percent of the roughly 4,000 
people arrested for marijuana possession in New York City were black or Hispanic.”). 
 17.  Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (2012) [hereinafter 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors]. 
 18.  See generally ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME (2018) (using 
original data on misdemeanor processes to offer a “bird’s-eye view” of “a massive criminal 
institution that stops, arrests, fines, incarcerates, labels, and otherwise punishes millions of people 
for all sorts of reasons that are often tenuously connected to public safety”).  
 19.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE COMMUNITIES TALKING POINTS 2 (2010) 
[hereinafter SECURE COMMUNITIES TALKING POINTS], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_
communities/talkingpointsjanuary122010.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LZM-254J] (suggesting that 
implementation of the Secure Communities program would “require[] little to no change to . . . 
current [law enforcement] procedures”). 
 20.  Infra Part II.  
 21.  Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).  
 22.  Id. at 237–38. 
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had been ordered removed and sentenced to two months of hard labor 
before the deportation took place.23 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the deportation but dismissed the prison sentence because it had been 
imposed without due process.24 The Court held that if the government 
sought to punish noncitizens, it could not do so through civil legal 
proceedings—it must instead do so through criminal law and provide 
defendants with the heightened protections that accompany criminal 
sanctions.25 The opinion said nothing about pretrial detention, 
however. Jailhouse immigration screening exploits this gap; it permits 
jailed individuals to be subject to longer pretrial detention for 
suspected civil immigration violations. This approach has an effect that 
is akin to imposing criminal punishment. But because pretrial 
detention is not considered formal punishment, it is not governed by 
Wong Wing.  
Even as immigration screening has moved to the jailhouse, it has 
not adopted procedural protections meant to guard against 
government overreach in the criminal law. Secure Communities 
operates by crosschecking fingerprints taken as part of the criminal 
booking process with various DHS fingerprint databases.26 An 
immigration officer reviews the database comparisons and seeks to 
quickly send an immigration detainer to the local jail.27 The detainer 
requests that the jail hold the arrested individual for two extra days so 
that immigration officials can assume custody.28 No judicial process 
accompanies the issuance of immigration detainers.29 The process for 
conducting immigration screening is systemically detached from 
probable cause determinations that any given individual is removable. 
There is no national database of citizens or noncitizens, and the 
 
 23.  Id. at 233–34. 
 24.  Id. at 237–38. 
 25.  See id. at 238. 
 26.  SECURE COMMUNITIES TALKING POINTS, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
 27.  Amaya Report, supra note 3, at 6 (“Because the goal of Secure Communities is to 
prevent a suspected immigration law violator from bonding out or otherwise being released from 
local custody, the emphasis is on lodging detainers quickly.”). 
 28. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETAINER—NOTICE OF ACTION 
[hereinafter IMMIGRATION DETAINER], https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Document/2017/I-247A.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXB6-LWLE].  
 29.  ICE detainers are accompanied only by administrative warrants. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENF’T, POL. NO. 10074.2, ISSUANCE OF IMMIGRATION DETAINERS BY ICE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS 
2 (2017) [hereinafter ICE IMMIGRATION DETAINERS], https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Document/2017/10074-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV6J-KD83].  
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government’s removal process rests on databases that a federal court 
determined “often contain incomplete data, significant errors, or were 
not designed to provide information that would be used to determine 
a person’s removability.”30  
Jailhouse screening magnifies the risk of removing residents from 
within the United States without adequate care for accuracy or 
procedural fairness, and it magnifies the selection biases of domestic 
policing. This approach undercuts immigration enforcement 
objectives. Immigration enforcement decisions build the polity in a 
number of ways, such as through decisions about unifying families, 
building a workforce, promoting assimilation, or providing 
humanitarian relief.31 Jailhouse immigration screening is thought to 
channel enforcement discretion in a way that is more rule bound. But 
in effect, it magnifies the potential for government overreach in both 
immigration and criminal law. It obscures how domestic policing 
decisions set the agenda for immigration regulation and how 
immigration decisions affect the criminal justice process. 
If jailhouse immigration screening magnifies the length of carceral 
treatment after a low-level arrest and creates new risks of detaining 
and expelling those who are not removal priorities, then it cannot be 
justified on the grounds of targeting enforcement. Immigration 
enforcement should uncouple from the criminal arrest process 
altogether. Barring that approach, jailhouse screening requires greater 
front-end procedural protections akin to those of criminal law. One 
particularly important change is to hold the government to its burden 
of proof in establishing probable cause for a detainer. Consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, immigration detainer decisions should be 
subject to neutral magistrate review.  
 
 30.  Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2019), rev’d in part, 975 F.3d 788 
(9th Cir. 2020). The court determined that these databases “incorrectly identified visa overstays 
more than 42 percent of the time.” Id. at 1010. The Ninth Circuit subsequently vacated the 
decision and remanded it for additional factfinding, given that the district court had not made 
findings of fact for each of the multiple databases at issue. Gonzalez, 975 F.3d at 797. 
 31.  Setting aside jailhouse immigration screening, one criticism of immigration law is that it 
fails to meet these objectives in a defensible way. See, e.g., Stephen Lee, Family Separation as 
Slow Death, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2319, 2322 (2019) (arguing that the U.S. “immigration system is 
pervasively organized around principles of family separation”); Mariela Olivares, The Rise of 
Zero Tolerance and the Demise of Family, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287, 295–301, 348–49 (2020) 
(discussing recent family separation policies and arguing that these policies are indefensible, given 
their impact on children). This Article makes an analogous argument by showing that jailhouse 
screening is not actually adhering to its stated, targeted-enforcement rationale.  
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The balance of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I explains the 
rise of jailhouse immigration screening and how it came to be viewed 
as a targeted approach to immigration enforcement. Part II focuses on 
the screening process within the jailhouse and explains how jailhouse 
screening creates extended carceral treatment and due process 
violations. Part III argues that jailhouse screening elevates carceral 
interests over immigration interests and resuscitates what is 
experienced as a punitive approach to immigration enforcement. This 
approach undermines immigration law objectives. Part IV argues for 
uncoupling immigration screening from the jailhouse and for 
establishing greater front-end procedural protections.  
I.  THE RISE OF JAILHOUSE IMMIGRATION SCREENING  
The United States has the largest immigrant population in the 
world.32 But approximately eleven million noncitizens have no lawful 
status within the United States.33 Because Congress has rendered such 
a large proportion of the population removable, immigration 
enforcement officials necessarily exercise prosecutorial discretion. 
Jailhouse immigration screening has the stated aim of targeting 
enforcement efforts, with a particular focus on noncitizens with serious 
criminal convictions.  
This Part shows how jailhouse immigration screening developed 
and came to be conceptualized as a targeted model of enforcement. It 
situates jailhouse screening in relation to two other enforcement 
approaches: race-based street stops and a crime-control model of 
enforcement. Jailhouse immigration screening avoids the appearance 
of racialized street stops, and it also allows the government to depict 
immigration enforcement as concentrating on “criminal aliens.”  
A. Race-Based Enforcement 
The first U.S. immigration laws were expressly race based. White 
residents were presumed to be on the “inside” of immigration law, 
while Chinese immigrants—the first nonwhite population to immigrate 
voluntarily in large numbers—were not. The period of Chinese 
Exclusion established the plenary power doctrine that gives Congress 
largely unreviewable power to exclude noncitizens at the border. It also 
 
 32.  Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 20, 
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants 
[https://perma.cc/Y52Q-85AH].  
 33.  Id.  
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established a body of constitutional procedures that apply in removal 
proceedings. In theory, these procedures were meant to ensure that 
Congress could not summarily expel those suspected of being 
removable from the United States.  
With the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the United 
States prohibited all Chinese immigration to the United States.34 In a 
seminal decision, Chae Chan Ping v. United States,35 the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act on the grounds that federal 
immigration law was subject to unique, largely unreviewable deference 
by courts.36 Subsequent laws sought to deport ethnically Chinese 
residents living in the United States. The Geary Act of 1892 provided 
that “any Chinese person or person of Chinese descent” found in the 
United States was subject to deportation “unless such person shall 
establish, by affirmative proof . . . his lawful right to remain in the 
United States.”37 All Chinese residents were required to obtain a 
“certificate of residence” from the local collector of internal revenue 
at the risk of deportation.38 The law handed white residents the keys to 
enforcement: it created an exception for Chinese residents who could 
establish good cause for not obtaining a certificate and demonstrate 
“by at least one credible white witness” that they had been living in the 
United States before the passage of the Geary Act.39 Only about 15 
percent of the eligible Chinese population registered, leaving 
approximately eighty thousand people in the United States in violation 
of the law.40 
The Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United States41 upheld the Geary 
Act, reasoning that courts should defer to the “political departments” 
in matters of immigration law.42 The majority stated that “it behooves 
the court to be careful that it does not undertake to pass upon political 
questions, the final decision of which has been committed by the 
 
 34.  Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (repealed 1943).  
 35.  Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
 36.  Id. at 609. 
 37.  Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat 25, 25 (repealed 1943).  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 26.  
 40.  Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in 
IMMIGRATION STORIES 17 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).  
 41.  Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).  
 42.  Id. at 731.  
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Constitution to the other departments of the government.”43 This 
deference in the immigration context is known as the “plenary power” 
doctrine.44 Although the plenary power doctrine has weakened in key 
respects over time, Congress and the President continue to receive 
deference from courts when passing laws related to admission and 
removal.45 For our purposes, what matters is that the political branches 
retain significant discretion to determine which noncitizens may be 
removed from inside the United States.  
The Geary Act applied to every person of “Chinese descent,”46 
including those born in the United States. Part of the goal of Chinese 
Exclusion was to prevent the growth of second-generation Chinese 
families in the United States.47 However, in United States v. Wong Kim 
Ark,48 issued five years after Fong Yue Ting, the Court struck down this 
approach and held that the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution extended to all those born “within the jurisdiction” of the 
United States, regardless of the nationality of their parents.49 Once 
courts recognized birthright citizenship, lawmakers could no longer 
expressly treat “Chinese descent” as synonymous with noncitizen 
status. This, in turn, led to a body of constitutional doctrine that 
regulated the procedures accompanying removal. 
In the 1903 decision Yamataya v. Fisher,50 the Court held that all 
those admitted to the United States are entitled to certain due process 
 
 43.  Id. at 712. As Professors Cox and Rodríguez discuss, the Court did not explain whether 
the courts should defer to Congress or to the President, or what the balance of power between 
the political branches should be in immigration law. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and 
Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 472.  
 44.  See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 581 
(1889).  
 45.  Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era of 
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 59–60 (2015) (commenting on a “slow[] 
chipping away” of the plenary power doctrine in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence); Hiroshi 
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms 
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549, 551 n.23 (1990) (arguing that the plenary 
power doctrine has been undermined through statutory interpretation).  
 46.  Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat 25, 25 (repealed 1943). 
 47.  See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 647 (2005) (explaining how legislators sought to restrict Chinese women 
from immigrating and forming families in the United States).  
 48.  United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
 49.  Id. at 687–88, 705.  
 50.  Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
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protections in removal proceedings.51 In Yamataya, the Court 
permitted a Japanese national who had been admitted into the United 
States, but then detained on the grounds she was likely to become a 
public charge, to bring a habeas petition challenging her immigration 
detention.52 The Court reiterated the plenary power doctrine as a 
matter of substance but held that the adequacy of the procedures used 
in removal proceedings would be subject to judicial review.53  
The current statutory approach provides that those admitted into 
the United States are entitled to a removal hearing before an 
immigration judge, where the government must establish removability, 
including alienage, by clear and convincing evidence.54 If ordered 
removed, an individual who claims U.S. citizenship is entitled to 
heightened procedural protections in the form of a review before a 
federal court of appeals.55 The court of appeals reviews the record to 
determine whether the petitioner has raised a “genuine issue of 
material fact” about his nationality.56 If so, the petitioner is entitled to 
a de novo factual review of U.S. citizenship claims by a district court.57 
If, however, the court of appeals determines “from the pleadings and 
affidavits that no genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s 
nationality is presented,” then it decides the nationality claim from the 
existing administrative record without referring it to a district court for 
review.58  
Despite a constitutional and statutory approach meant to 
distinguish alienage from race, racial minorities perceived as foreign 
 
 51.  Id. at 101.  
 52.  Id. at 87. For a discussion of immigration habeas, see, for example, Gerald L. Neuman, 
Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 987–
1020 (1998) and Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through 
the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 495 (2006).  
 53.  See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–02. 
 54.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (c)(3)(A) (2018); see Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605, 608–10 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (discussing burdens of proof). 
 55.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). 
 56. Id. § 1252(b)(4)(A), (b)(5). 
 57. Id. § 1252(b)(5)(B). The motion to reconsider must be filed within thirty days. Id.  
§ 1229a(c)(6)(B). If there is a genuine issue of material fact about foreign nationality, a district 
court conducts a de novo review. Id. § 1252(b)(5)(B). If “the petitioner . . . introduce[s] sufficient 
evidence that he is a U.S. citizen, [the burden shifts] to the government to rebut by ‘clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence.” Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 
2015) (quoting Chau v. INS, 247 F.3d 1026, 1029 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Alexander v. 
Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 740, 743–44 (D. Ariz. 2017) (discussing burdens of proof). 
 58.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (5)(A), (b)(7)(B).  
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continued to face deportation risks because of inadequate process and 
pressures to stipulate to removability. As historian Mae Ngai discusses, 
the creation of a landed border patrol in the 1920s led to the systemic 
expulsion of U.S. citizens stereotyped as Mexican.59 Mass removals 
continued through programs such as “Operation Wetback,” and they 
reflected power disparities between the Border Patrol agents and 
farmworkers who had no practical ability to challenge the procedures 
leading to their removal.60  
Racial proxies continue to play a role in street stops today. 
Immigration officers wield the statutory authority “to interrogate any 
alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain 
in the United States” within one hundred miles from the border.61 This 
statutory authority is far-reaching, given that approximately “two-
thirds of the United States’ population”—or 200 million people—lives 
within the border zone.62 In a 1976 decision, United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte,63 the Court held that immigration officers could engage in brief 
stops at a fixed checkpoint for any reason, including on the basis of 
race.64 In the context of a roving immigration stop, immigration officers 
 
 59.  MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS 60–64, 149–52 (William Chafe, Gary Gerstle, 
Linda Gordon & Julian Zelizer eds., 2004) (discussing a history of the creation of the Border 
Patrol and the concept of “illegal alien” as well as the lack of distinction between people who 
were legally or illegally in the United States from Mexico); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The 
Forgotten “Repatriation” of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the “War on Terror,” 
26 PACE L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (“Approximately 60 percent of the persons of Mexican ancestry 
removed to Mexico in the 1930s were U.S. citizens, many of them children who were effectively 
deported to Mexico when their immigrant parents were sent there.”). 
 60.  See Kevin R. Johnson, Trump’s Latinx Repatriation, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1444, 1462–64 
(2019) (“Teams of Border Patrol agents, buses, planes, and temporary processing stations 
implemented Operation Wetback” and they made “no real distinction . . . between immigrants 
and U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry.”).  
 61.  8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1), (a)(3) (providing these powers “within a reasonable distance from 
any external boundary of the United States”). “[R]easonable distance” from the border is not 
defined by statute, but regulations provide for it being one hundred miles from any port of entry. 
8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (2020). In the “border zone,” immigration officers also have the authority 
“to board and search for aliens,” including “any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle” to 
check immigration status. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3).  
 62.  The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/
constitution-100-mile-border-zone [https://perma.cc/NG6Z-KMFS] (providing a graphic 
depicting the border zone population).  
 63.  United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 64.  Id. at 562–63, 566. 
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must have “reasonable suspicion” of unauthorized presence to engage 
in the stop, but race may play a role in forming reasonable suspicion.65  
This approach persists, despite massive demographic changes 
since the 1970s. In 1976, the Court justified its approach partially on 
statistics that Mexican residents constituted 85 percent of the 
undocumented population.66 Today, Mexican residents constitute less 
than 50 percent of the undocumented population,67 and the U.S. 
population is far more racially diverse overall.68 U.S. residents racially 
stereotyped as undocumented bear a disproportionate toll when it 
comes to stops conducted by federal immigration officers.69 Part of the 
appeal of jailhouse screening is that it seems to shift away from racial 
proxies in the context of street stops. 
Reducing street stops may also appear to lower enforcement costs. 
Street stops are overinclusive. In Martinez-Fuerte, checkpoint officials 
stopped 146,000 vehicles in an eight-day period and ultimately made 
725 immigration arrests.70 The jailhouse seems to offer a targeted 
approach in comparison to checkpoints, given that it does not depend 
on costly and intrusive status checks. Those who are never subject to 
criminal arrest never experience immigration screening.  
 
 65.  See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882–83, 886–87 (1975) (stating the 
“requirement of reasonable suspicion” and noting that race may be a factor in forming reasonable 
suspicion, but it may not be the sole factor). 
 66.  See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551 (“It is estimated that 85% of the illegal immigrants 
are from Mexico . . . .”).  
 67.  Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, What We Know About Illegal 
Immigration from Mexico, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 28, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/06/28/what-we-know-about-illegal-immigration-from-mexico [https://perma.cc/97XA-
BGTQ].  
 68.  William H. Frey, The Nation Is Diversifying Even Faster than Predicted, According to New 
Census Data, BROOKINGS INST. (July 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/new-census-
data-shows-the-nation-is-diversifying-even-faster-than-predicted [https://perma.cc/D4Q7-SRL7]. 
 69.  As Professors Devon Carbado and Cheryl Harris argue, “because Latino identity is 
deemed relevant to the question of whether a person is undocumented, all Latinos live under a 
condition of presumed illegality.” Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented 
Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1546 (2011). 
 70.  Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554. The checkpoint at issue in Martinez-Fuerte screened 
all cars passing through and referred some for “secondary” inspection. Id. The Court cited 
statistics that “[d]uring an eight-day period in 1974 . . . roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through 
the checkpoint during 124 ⅙ hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles were referred to the 
secondary inspection area, where Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens.” Id.  
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B. Crime Control as Immigration Control 
Beginning in the 1980s and accelerating in 1996, Congress vastly 
expanded the grounds for removing immigrants based on criminal 
convictions.71 The crime-control model made criminal convictions 
relevant to deportation on a mass scale. Immigration law and criminal 
law had long been connected, but the new federal laws imposed 
mandatory immigration prosecution after a range of convictions.72 The 
1996 laws also required that noncitizens convicted of certain crimes be 
transferred to immigration detention immediately after serving their 
criminal sentences.73 These legal changes made it possible for both 
misdemeanor and felony convictions to trigger deportation.74 
 
 71.  See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 
and 28 U.S.C.) (revising criminal penalties for when undocumented immigrants commit crimes in 
the United States); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§§ 431–443, 110 Stat. 1214, 1273–81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) 
(providing procedural changes to removal of immigrants with criminal convictions). For an 
explanation of these changes and a criticism of them, see generally Nancy Morawetz, 
Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed 
Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1938–43 (2000), describing the impacts of the 1996 deportation 
laws. This Article highlights 1996 given the sweeping nature of those immigration enactments. 
But Congress had also enacted other changes in the 1980s, in 1990, and in 1994 that expanded the 
grounds for removal on the basis of a criminal conviction. For a discussion of the earlier changes, 
see Chacón, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 14, at 321–23; see also Alina Das, Inclusive 
Immigrant Justice: Racial Animus and the Origins of Crime-Based Deportation, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 171, 182–85 (2018) (arguing that earlier racially-based immigration restrictions were also 
linked to crime control).  
 72.  The first immigration laws were linked to crime control. Das, supra note 71, at 182–85. 
Congress banned those convicted of “crimes ‘involving moral turpitude’” from entry in 1891. Id. 
at 179 (quoting Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084). Illegal entry became a 
crime in 1929. Act of Mar. 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551. For a discussion 
of the early connections between crime control and immigration control, see Mae M. Ngai, The 
Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United 
States, 1921–1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 71, 73 (2003). 
 73.  Morawetz, supra note 71, at 1946.  
 74.  See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 574 (2010) (involving a lawful 
permanent resident who faced deportation on the basis of two misdemeanor drug arrests—one 
for a small amount of marijuana, the other for possession of a single Xanax tablet—and holding 
that whether the second conviction counted as an “aggravated felony” for immigration purposes 
turned on whether the criminal prosecutor had charged the second offense as a recidivist drug 
possession offense); see also Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 
1209–10 (2016) [hereinafter Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences] (describing how relatively 
low-level criminal convictions can trigger immigration consequences); Stephen H. Legomsky, The 
New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 469, 484 (2007) (describing the “aggravated felony” as “a colossus”). 
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The crime-control model is premised on the theory that criminal 
convictions should be a determining factor in removal.75 In 1996, 
Congress vastly expanded the grounds for deporting noncitizens on the 
basis of criminal convictions.76 In addition, after 1990, sentencing 
judges could no longer issue a binding recommendation against 
removal known as “a judicial recommendation against deportation.”77 
Criminal convictions became a linchpin in determining deportability.  
Linking immigration removal decisions to criminal convictions 
raises troubling questions about adequate process within the criminal 
justice system. Because of ubiquitous plea bargaining in the criminal 
justice system, some noncitizens plead guilty to criminal offenses 
without understanding the immigration consequences of those guilty 
pleas. In a 2010 decision, Padilla v. Kentucky,78 the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized how “[o]ur law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the 
penalty of deportation” and observed that it was “‘most difficult’ to 
divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.”79 
Padilla held that, under the Sixth Amendment, defense lawyers have 
an obligation to advise defendants if their guilty pleas will trigger 
mandatory deportation.80 The Court determined that a lawful 
permanent resident who had lived in the United States for over forty 
years was denied effective assistance of counsel by not being informed 
that his guilty plea would result in deportation.81  
Padilla represented a significant shift both in recognizing how 
deportation can function as a punishment and in the importance of 
defense counsel in plea bargaining. As Judge Stephanos Bibas notes, it 
was “the Court’s first case to treat plea bargaining as a subject worthy 
of constitutional regulation in its own right and on its own terms.”82 
Padilla moved away from the formal labels of civil and criminal and 
 
 75.  See David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 157, 178–79 (2012) (discussing an eighty-fold increase in noncitizens removed each 
year because of criminal convictions from 1981 to 2005). 
 76.  Morawetz, supra note 71, at 1938–43. 
 77.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361–63 (2010) (discussing “JRAD,” or “judicial 
recommendation against deportation”).  
 78.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 79.  Id. at 365–66 (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
 80.  Id. at 374.  
 81.  Id. at 359, 368, 374. 
 82.  Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1120 (2011). 
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instead focused on how defendants experience deportation.83 The 
Court recognized that deportation can matter more to a defendant 
than the formal criminal sentence, and consequently it requires 
additional procedural protections under the Sixth Amendment.84 
Defense attorneys must now ascertain the immigration status of a 
criminal defendant, research the immigration consequences that stem 
from a plea agreement, and advise defendants if the plea will trigger 
mandatory deportation. This Sixth Amendment obligation takes place 
in the criminal justice system—well before any removal proceedings 
are initiated.  
C. The Targeted-Enforcement Model 
Jailhouse immigration screening incorporates the crime-control 
model by relying on the process of criminal arrest to identify 
noncitizens for removal. This approach, in theory, has a number of 
potential benefits: it lowers the costs of screening, takes immigration 
screening off the street, and permits immigration officials to screen a 
large universe of arrested individuals and to make enforcement 
decisions that appear to reflect federal enforcement priorities.85 
Jailhouse immigration screening also offers a way to avoid the 
appearance of racial bias. Unlike street stops, jailhouse immigration 
screening can be presented as race neutral. Everyone in the jail has 
their immigration status checked; immigration officials do not pick and 
choose who is subject to screening.86 Jailhouse screening also avoids 
deputizing police officers as immigration officers. Police officers are 
supposed to go about their normal arrest activities; they are not 
supposed to target those suspected of lacking immigration status. 
 
 83.  See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 700, 703 (2002) (asserting that 
deportation “can operate as a secret sentence” and arguing for plea bargaining that is informed 
about the collateral consequences of criminal convictions). 
 84.  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361–64 (noting the importance of the prior procedural protection 
of a “judicial recommendation against deportation” and discussing how the elimination of this 
protection emphasized how integral deportation is to criminal penalties).  
 85.  See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, Immigration Law Redux, supra note 4, at 189 (describing the 
potential of Secure Communities “to make decisions about removal both more consistent and 
more responsive to federal priorities”). 
 86.  Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810 (2015) (describing how the 
process of criminal arrest is used akin to an auditing tool, with everyone in the jailhouse subject 
to screening).  
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Jailhouse screening relies largely on fingerprint comparisons 
rather than interviews.87 Street stops depend on a brief period of 
questioning. Immigration officers have no authority to prolong the stop 
or to take fingerprints absent probable cause. By contrast, government 
officials have broad authority to gather identity information from those 
already in criminal custody. In Maryland v. King,88 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the government is entitled to collect DNA swabs from 
anyone in criminal custody for a serious offense in order to gather 
identity information.89 And states have long had a practice of routinely 
obtaining fingerprint information from those in criminal custody.90 
Jailhouse immigration screening uses information obtained during the 
criminal booking process to make removal decisions.  
Secure Communities began to be implemented in 2008.91 The 
Obama administration made it a cornerstone of its immigration 
enforcement approach.92 By 2013, it had been implemented 
nationwide.93 For an eighteen-month period toward the end of the 
Obama administration, Secure Communities was discontinued and 
jailhouse screening was renamed the Priority Enforcement Program.94 
The name change was meant to further signal the aim of targeting 
enforcement efforts.95 Immigration officers were instructed to focus on 
 
 87.  Cox & Miles, supra note 4, at 94 (noting that “Secure Communities relies on a 
fundamentally different—and much less labor-intensive—approach” than enforcement methods 
that depend on individual interviews). 
 88.  Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
 89.  Id. at 440 (the opinion does not define “serious” offense, but it does restrict DNA swabs 
to those arrested for “serious offenses”). 
 90.  Id. at 458–59. 
 91.  For a discussion of the rollout process, see Cox & Miles, supra note 4, at 96–103. 
 92.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 93.  Secure Communities, supra note 2.  
 94.  Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas 
S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, et al., Secure Communities (Nov. 20, 
2014) [hereinafter Secure Communities Memorandum], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/43XD-Y3UJ]; see also 
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. 
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, et al., Policies for the Apprehension, 
Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Detention and 
Removal Priorities Memorandum], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_
memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8VD-8W2D] (establishing new detention 
priorities effective January 5, 2015). 
 95.  See Secure Communities Memorandum, supra note 94, at 1 (acknowledging that the 
Secure Community program’s “very name has become a symbol for general hostility toward the 
enforcement of our immigration laws”). 
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specified priorities, including those convicted of certain felonies and 
violent crimes; recent unauthorized entrants or visa overstays; and 
those with multiple immigration violations.96 These priorities also 
signaled that the federal government was not handing immigration 
control responsibility to state and local police officers, as some 
proponents of more robust immigration enforcement have sought to 
do.97 Rather, jailhouse screening was presented as a way of harnessing 
the criminal arrest process while not handing police officers the ability 
to make immigration arrests.98 The Trump administration ended the 
Priority Enforcement Program and reinstituted the name “Secure 
Communities,” but continued to describe it as a way of “directing its 
enforcement resources to those aliens posing the greatest risk to the 
safety and security of the United States.”99 
In terms of the mechanics of the screening process, fingerprints 
and biographic information from arrested individuals are cross-
checked against databases maintained by DHS.100 Then, an automated 
program generates an Immigration Alien Response (“IAR”) form that 
indicates the basis for suspecting removability.101 An immigration 
officer ultimately reviews the IAR form and sends a detainer request 
to the local jail if the officer determines that the targeted individual is 
removable.102 The current detainer is a one-page checkbox form.103 It 
advises the local law enforcement agency that an immigration officer 
 
 96.  Detention and Removal Priorities Memorandum, supra note 94, at 3–4. 
 97.  The most notable proponent of this argument is politician Kris Kobach, who has argued 
that state and local police have the inherent authority to make immigration arrests. See Kris W. 
Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police To Make 
Immigration Arrests, 69 ALA. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005).  
 98.  For a discussion of racial profiling risks inherent in giving police officers immigration 
enforcement powers, see Huyen Pham, 287(g) Agreements in the Trump Era, 75 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1253, 1254, 1272–73 (2018).  
 99.  U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
FISCAL YEAR 2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 12 (2019), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019/eroReportFY2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FX95-43J8]; Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 
(Jan. 30, 2017).  
 100.  Secure Communities, supra note 2. 
 101.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) 
SECURE COMMUNITIES (SC) STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) 3–5, https://
www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2N93-LFW8]. 
 102.  8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a)(1) (2020).  
 103.  IMMIGRATION DETAINER, supra note 28.  
JAIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2021  8:05 PM 
1722  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1703 
has probable cause to believe that the detainee is removable.104 The 
immigration officer checks one of four options to indicate the basis of 
removability: a prior removal order; ongoing removal proceedings; 
“biometric confirmation” of the alien’s identity; or statements and/or 
other reliable evidence that affirmatively indicate removability.105 The 
detainer requests that the local law enforcement agency retain custody 
of the arrested individual for an additional forty-eight hours after he 
would otherwise be released so that immigration enforcement officials 
may assume custody.106  
Compliance with immigration detainers is not mandatory.107 But 
even when localities elect not to comply with detainers, the verification 
process takes place. Approximately 70 percent of the arrests ICE 
makes in the interior of the United States now result from detainers 
lodged against those in criminal custody.108 Secure Communities allows 
the government to issue detainers to far more people than before. In 
fiscal year 2005, before Secure Communities, ICE issued six hundred 
detainers per month; by the end of fiscal year 2011, three years after 
Secure Communities began to be implemented, ICE issued more than 
twenty-six thousand detainers per month.109  
In sum, jailhouse immigration screening has been perceived as 
targeted because it focuses on gathering identifying information in the 
jailhouse and using that information to make removal decisions that fit 
executive branch priorities. This approach affects only those subject to 
criminal arrest, does not depend on individual stops or interviews, and 
permits the Executive to establish high-level priorities for removal. 
II.  THE IMPACT OF JAILHOUSE IMMIGRATION SCREENING  
The targeted-enforcement model rests on two assumptions: first, 
jailhouse immigration screening does not affect the criminal process, 
and second, jailhouse immigration screening provides an accurate way 
 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id.; Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2019), rev’d in part, 975 F.3d 
788 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 106.  IMMIGRATION DETAINER, supra note 28. 
 107.  Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640, 643 (3d Cir. 2014) (observing that “no U.S. Court 
of Appeals has ever described ICE detainers as anything but requests” and discussing that if 
detainers were to be construed as mandatory, that would pose constitutional problems). 
 108.  News Release, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Local ICE Director Discusses Sanctuary 
Policy Impact on Public Safety (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/local-ice-
director-discusses-sanctuary-policy-impact-public-safety [https://perma.cc/AG2A-XMZD].  
 109.  Gonzalez, 975 F.3d at 799.  
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to determine who should be subject to immigration arrest. Both of 
these assumptions fail. Jailhouse screening has an immediate impact on 
the criminal justice process. It leads to extended carceral treatment, 
such as the denial of bail and more punitive plea bargains. Second, the 
screening process oversimplifies immigration status determinations 
and ties them to faulty database comparisons. This approach leads to 
detainers that are systemically unsupported by probable cause. In 
addition, jailhouse screening targets a vulnerable population that is 
particularly poorly situated to explain their status or contest detainers. 
All of these factors can create new risks of removing residents who are 
not legally removable, much less removal priorities.  
Florida resident Pete Brown’s experience illustrates how jailhouse 
screening creates the risk of extended carceral treatment and error.110 
As one of approximately 4.4 million adults subject to probation or 
parole in the United States, Brown was required to submit to regular 
drug screenings.111 He turned himself in after a screening showed low-
level marijuana use.112 After he was booked into jail for his probation 
violation, an immigration detainer was lodged against him.113 The 
detainer had an immediate consequence for the criminal justice 
process; it meant that, rather than being released, Brown would spend 
the next three weeks in jail pending his criminal court appearance.114 
Brown explained to jailhouse officials that he was a U.S. citizen, but he 
had no opportunity to contest the detainer while in criminal custody.115 
When he eventually appeared in court, the judge ordered his release 
and reinstated the probation, thus terminating his criminal court 
case.116 Only then was he formally transferred to immigration custody 
 
 110.  Complaint ¶ 8, Brown v. Ramsay, 4:18-cv-10279, 2019 WL 8128928 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 
2018), 2018 WL 6340578 [hereinafter Brown Complaint].  
 111.  See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of 
Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 292, 301, 316, 325 (2016) (discussing common requirements of 
probation); LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017-18, at 2 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpus1718.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WEE-FL8S] (noting that there were 3,540,000 
persons on probation and 878,000 persons on parole in 2018). 
 112.  Brown Complaint, supra note 110, ¶ 18. 
 113.  Id. ¶ 20.  
 114.  Id. ¶ 46. 
 115.  Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
 116.  Id. ¶ 41. 
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and given the chance to contest the detainer with an immigration 
officer.117  
Brown’s case shows how jailhouse immigration screening has a 
profound effect on the criminal process. First, the immigration 
screening process disproportionately affects those arrested for 
misdemeanors, not felonies. It also imports the selection biases of 
criminal law. The criminalization of marijuana in particular 
disproportionately affects racial minorities.118 In New York City alone, 
in recent years, Black and Latino defendants have constituted almost 
90 percent of misdemeanor marijuana possession cases.119 Second, the 
immigration screening process makes the criminal process harsher. In 
Brown’s case, the detainer meant immediate extended criminal 
detention. As a formal matter, however, the detainer only came into 
effect at the conclusion of the criminal case. It had a hidden effect on 
the criminal process.  
In Brown’s case, the detainer was not actually supported by 
probable cause—but Brown had no effective ability to challenge the 
detainer, even though he had friends outside the jail who were willing 
to help him access documentation to prove his citizenship status.120 
During his time in jail, the detainer marked him as a removable 
Jamaican national.121 The detainer denoted a particular legal status, 
similar to a criminal warrant—and even though it had an immediate 
effect on Brown, there was no way for Brown to challenge that marker 
while in criminal detention. Brown’s experience could also have come 
out differently. Had Brown been more vulnerable—had he not 
continued to contest his immigration status determination after his 
transfer to immigration custody—he could have been deported. 
This Part details three features of jailhouse screening—front-end 
carceral treatment, Fourth Amendment violations, and a focus on a 
 
 117.  Id. ¶ 42. 
 118.  ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 17–20 (2013), https://
www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WA39-6UZA].  
 119.  Benjamin Mueller, Robert Gebeloff & Sahil Chinoy, Surest Way To Face Marijuana 
Charges in New York: Be Black or Hispanic, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/nyregion/marijuana-arrests-nyc-race.html [https://perma.cc/PZ6J-
L43D]; Mueller, supra note 16 (“In the first three months of [2018], 89 percent of the roughly 
4,000 people arrested for marijuana possession in New York City were black or Hispanic.”). 
 120.  Brown Complaint, supra note 110, ¶ 57. He called the DHS hotline, but eventually gave 
up because the wait times were too long for him to remain on hold. Id. ¶¶ 34–36. 
 121.  Id. ¶ 16. 
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vulnerable population—and it explains how they belie the targeted-
enforcement model.  
A. Front-End Carceral Treatment  
Jailhouse immigration screening is premised on the assumption 
that immigration and criminal law are two distinct systems that both 
happen to operate in the same space. As Professor Ingrid Eagly argues, 
immigration law and criminal law are assumed to be “institutionally 
autonomous.”122 The underlying theory is that the government can rely 
on criminal arrests to identify noncitizens for potential removal 
without influencing the criminal justice process. Yet in practice, front-
end immigration screening decisions have cascading and immediate 
consequences in the criminal justice system, such as the denial of bail 
and harsher plea offers.  
Some local law enforcement agencies appropriate immigration 
detainers as formal “markers” that affect how they process criminal 
cases. Sociologists have conceptualized the mark of a criminal record 
as a form of “public credentialing.”123 The mark of a prior criminal 
conviction, for instance, leads to systemically harsher plea bargains for 
recidivists.124 Immigration detainers also serve as markers that formally 
affect dispositions and bail. They impose enormous costs on arrested 
individuals who have not been convicted of any crime.  
Pretrial detainees held in federal detention are entitled to release 
under the Bail Reform Act unless a judicial officer determines that no 
conditions of release “would reasonably assure the appearance of the 
defendant and the safety of the community.”125 Immigration status is 
 
 122.  Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (2010) 
(defining “institutional autonomy” as the view “that the immigration and criminal systems 
operate as independent institutions with distinct adjudicatory models, sanctioning regimes, and 
actors—reinforcing the ‘criminal-civil’ divide” (emphasis omitted)). 
 123.  See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 611, 643–44 (2014); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 939 
(2003).  
 124.  See generally Christopher Lewis, The Paradox of Recidivism, 70 EMORY L.J. 
(forthcoming May 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3582065 [https://
perma.cc/GHN8-C8MJ] (describing and criticizing recidivist sentencing enhancements).  
 125.  United States v. Diaz-Hernandez, 943 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2019); see also United 
States v. Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1174 (D. Or. 2012) (explaining that “persons who 
are not citizens must be treated under the BRA like all other persons charged with an offense”). 
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not a listed factor for court consideration, but it may be taken into 
account in evaluating flight risk.126  
In contrast to federal law, some states do formally take 
immigration status into account in setting bail.127 But even when state 
law does not expressly take into account alienage, courts may view 
immigration status—and specifically, the presence of an immigration 
detainer—as relevant to flight risk. One state court made the unusual 
decision to revoke the initial bail after the defendant had already 
posted it, and to increase it by fourfold, based on the presence of an 
immigration detainer.128 The increased bail was upheld even though the 
criminal prosecutor had been aware of the defendant’s undocumented 
status when the initial bail amount was set.129 In upholding the bail 
increase, the court stated, without any supporting authority, that the 
“filing of a detainer signifies ICE’s commitment to remove an alien” 
and “sets in motion the entire removal process,” which in turn, creates 
the risk that the defendant would “avoid prosecution and possible 
punishment” by being deported to his country of origin.130 The court 
incorrectly equated the filing of a detainer with the commencement of 
a removal proceeding.131 The presence of the civil immigration detainer 
had a dispositive effect on pretrial release in the criminal case.  
 
 126.  Diaz-Hernandez, 943 F.3d at 1198 (stating that “immigration status is not a listed factor” 
in the Bail Reform Act but that “[a]lienage may be taken into account” in evaluating flight risk 
(quoting United States v. Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015))). 
 127.  See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22(A)(4) (denying bail for “serious felony offenses” for 
those who lack authorized immigration status); Hernandez v. State, 669 S.E.2d 434, 435 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2008) (upholding prohibitively high bail in part because of evidence that the defendant was 
not lawfully in the country); Chin, supra note 14, at 1423–24 & nn.24–37 (explaining how “[m]any 
jurisdictions consider a defendant’s alienage in setting bail” and collecting cases and statutes). 
 128.  State v. Fajardo-Santos, 973 A.2d 933, 935–36 (N.J. 2009). 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. at 939–40 (upholding a fourfold increase in bail after the defendant had an 
immigration detainer lodged, based on the court’s determination that the detainer increased flight 
risk). 
 131.  In this case, the defendant had in fact been taken into immigration custody and removal 
proceedings had been commenced. Id. at 935. But the court based its decision on the presence of 
the detainer itself. For courts taking a different approach and recognizing a distinction between 
issuing a detainer and commencing removal proceedings, see, for example, Diaz-Hernandez, 943 
F.3d at 1199 (holding in a federal case that “detention of a ‘criminal defendant pending trial . . . 
and detention of a removable alien pursuant to the [Immigration and Nationality Act] are 
separate functions that serve separate purposes and are performed by different authorities’” and 
holding that a trial court “addressing whether pre-trial detention is appropriate under the Bail 
Reform Act, may not speculate as to what may or may not happen in the future to the defendant 
under a different statutory and regulatory regime” (quoting United States v. Vasquez-Benitez, 
919 F.3d 546, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2019))) and United States v. Xulam, 84 F.3d 441, 441 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 
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Criminal law enforcement officials in certain jurisdictions take 
immigration status into account while making discretionary decisions 
about pretrial release, charging, and plea bargaining. In a 2011 study, 
Eagly demonstrated the pronounced effect immigration status 
determinations have on how criminal cases proceed in Harris County, 
Texas and Maricopa County, Arizona—two of the largest jurisdictions 
for Secure Communities removals.132 In Harris County, a pretrial 
services official described an immigration detainer as “the end of the 
line for a personal bond release,” depending on the offense charged.133 
For felonies, heightened bond amounts were based “solely” on 
apparent immigration status “regardless of the severity of the felony 
charge or other characteristics of the defendant.”134 As Eagly 
documented, defense attorneys in Harris County “uniformly agree[d] 
that the possibility of getting probation or other nonincarceration 
dispositions for a client with questionable immigration status is 
‘basically zero.’”135 In Maricopa County, “immigration status can be 
considered in making individualized bail assessments” and is also a 
factor in plea agreements.136 Prosecutors bring charges and secure plea 
agreements for noncitizens in a way that maximizes the likelihood of 
removal.137 
The presence of an immigration detainer can also have an 
immediate impact on whether a suspected noncitizen is eligible for 
noncarceral dispositions, such as community service. Luis Hernandez 
was arrested in New York and charged with public lewdness, a 
misdemeanor.138 At the arraignment, the prosecutor recommended 
that Hernandez be released and complete three days of community 
service for his disposition. The judge responded: “You can’t ask for 
community service. He has an [Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”)] detainer.”139 The prosecutor then requested five days of jail 
 
1996) (“The fact that a detainer has been lodged does not mean appellant necessarily will be taken 
into custody by the INS if released by this Court.”). 
 132.  Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local 
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1131–35 (2013) [hereinafter Eagly, Criminal Justice]. 
 133.  Id. at 1175 n.202 (quoting a Harris County Pretrial Services official). 
 134.  Id. at 1174–75.  
 135.  Id. at 1176 (quoting Mark Hochglaube, Trial Chief, Harris County Public Defender’s 
Office). 
 136.  Id. at 1184, 1187–88. 
 137.  Id. at 1188. 
 138.  Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 139.  Id. at 197. 
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and, given the ICE detainer, that bail be set at a nominal amount of 
one dollar so Hernandez could accrue “time credit towards any 
eventual sentence he might . . . receiv[e].”140 Hernandez informed 
multiple officials in the jail, including “a social worker, two corrections 
officers, and a doctor, that he was a U.S. citizen,” but “[e]ach staff 
member told Hernandez that he or she could not help him.”141 After 
four days in detention, immigration officials canceled the detainer—
apparently realizing it had been issued without basis—which then 
triggered a customary practice of permitting the one-dollar bail to be 
automatically paid.142 As the Second Circuit determined, “but for the 
detainer, Hernandez would have been released” and sentenced to 
community service; he would not have received any jail time.143 His 
detention was “not for his failure to post bail but because of the 
detainer.”144 
Hernandez’s experience is in keeping with other research and 
caselaw showing how detainers bar arrested individuals from pretrial 
release, probation, work release, therapeutic drug programs, or other 
diversion programs that would otherwise have been made available.145 
Criminal prosecutors may deny diversion for a number of reasons, 
including because of the belief that diversion programs with limited 
capacity should be reserved for people who will rejoin their 
communities, rather than those who will be deported. A criminal 
 
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 208. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See C.F.C. v. Miami-Dade County, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1236, 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (“Because 
of the detainer, [plaintiff] was ‘not placed in a diversion program’ at his arraignment and remained 
in the County’s custody for over a month awaiting trial because he was not eligible for pretrial 
release.”); Mercado v. Dallas County, 229 F. Supp. 3d 501, 518–19 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (stating that 
the complaint plausibly alleges that “Dallas County had a widespread and widely known practice 
of refusing to release on bond pretrial detainees with immigration holds”), abrogated on other 
grounds by City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018); Chin, supra note 14, at 1430 
nn.69–71 (collecting cases that take into account unauthorized status for probation, work release, 
and drug treatment determinations); N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS NEED NOT 
BAR ACCESS TO JAIL DIVERSION PROGRAMS 1 (2009), https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/
NYCBA_Immigration%20Detainers_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD8K-CHYS] (“Many 
criminal court judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and service providers assume that an 
immigration detainer effectively disqualifies an otherwise eligible immigrant defendant from 
participating in . . . jail diversion programs.”); see also Cade, supra note 14, at 1790–91 (noting 
that many misdemeanor defendants cannot afford bail and immigrants are often subjected to 
higher bail requirements because they are seen as “flight risk[s]”).  
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prosecutor who denies access to a diversion she would otherwise 
recommend, however, may not convey that reasoning to the arrested 
individual. Criminal prosecutors are not obligated to explain the 
potential menu of options for disposing of a particular charge. 
Defendants who experience worse plea outcomes because of 
immigration detainers may be unaware of how the detainer affected 
the plea bargain.  
Even when the local law enforcement agency does not incorporate 
immigration detainers into pretrial release determinations, the 
detainer itself can play a role in how defendants choose to proceed. 
Arrested individuals who believe they will be transferred to 
immigration detention after posting a criminal court bond have good 
reason to remain in criminal custody. Time spent in immigration 
detention will not be credited to time served when the criminal case is 
ultimately resolved. That same time, however, will be credited if it is 
served in criminal detention. Defendants may thus perceive that they 
are better off not posting bond and remaining in criminal custody until 
the criminal court has disposed of the charges.146 Defendants make 
these decisions in a world of incomplete information about whether or 
not a detainer will actually result in immigration detention.  
The majority of those subject to detainers will not actually be 
picked up and removed by immigration officials. At a federal trial in 
May 2019, DHS officials testified that ICE elects not to follow up on 
approximately 80 percent of the jailhouse detainers it issues.147 It is 
troubling enough that immigration status determinations lead to 
extended jail time and then release, as they did in the cases of Brown 
and Hernandez. But in some cases, the extended jailtime also creates 
pressures for arrested individuals to stipulate to their own removal so 
as to be released from custody.  
 
 146.  See Eagly, Criminal Justice, supra note 132, at 1149 n.86 (discussing why a defendant 
with an immigration detainer may elect not to post bond); see also LENA GRABER & AMY 
SCHNITZER, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWS. GUILD, THE BAIL REFORM ACT 
AND RELEASE FROM CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION CUSTODY FOR FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS 1 (2013), https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_
advisories/crim/2013_Jun_federal-bail.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW7D-G9JB] (observing that “some 
noncitizens [with detainers lodged against them] do not seek bail because they fear . . . a transfer” 
to immigration detention and arguing that this perception is often not valid because “noncitizen 
defendants should in many cases be able to win release”).  
 147.  Cross-Appellant/Appellees’ Principal & Response Brief at 10, Gonzalez v. ICE, 975 
F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2020) (Nos. 20-55175, 20-55252), 2020 WL 3316911, at *10 [hereinafter 
Gonzalez Brief]. 
JAIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2021  8:05 PM 
1730  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1703 
In 2009, political scientist Jacqueline Stevens conducted a rare 
interview with a U.S. citizen who had been deported and then had 
returned to the United States.148 Mario Guerrero stipulated to his own 
removal after a criminal conviction for robbery and was then deported 
to Mexico.149 He was twice apprehended at the border and charged 
with felony unlawful reentry.150 The charges were eventually dropped 
after his federal defender investigated his citizenship status for the first 
time.151 In explaining why he had stipulated to removal, Guerrero 
explained that he was told:  
“You fight deportation or you sign the paper. If you don’t sign, you 
might spend a year here.” All I wanted to do is get out because I 
already spent a year. I signed the paper and I got out. They told me I 
was giving up my rights but nothing was for sure. I could spend 
another year in jail or get out.152 
Guerrero’s experience shows how the threat of detention can lead 
to deportations that do not accurately reflect legal status. In both 
criminal law and immigration law, the threat of ongoing detention 
creates incentives to take quick pleas. Defendants operating with 
limited information may make the rational judgment to “sign the 
paper” to get out of detention.  
Once noncitizens are identified in the jailhouse, they systemically 
lack access to immigration adjudication. Today, a large proportion of 
those removed from the United States never appear before an 
immigration judge.153 Judicial review of expedited removal orders is 
 
 148.  Stevens conducted interviews with Mario Guerrero and his sister. Jacqueline Stevens, 
U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 606, 678 (2011).  
 149.  Id. at 678–79. 
 150.  Id. at 679, 681. After his first unlawful reentry arrest, Guerrero was convicted and 
sentenced to seven years and five months in federal prison. Id. at 679–80. After serving his 
sentence, he was released at the border and told to walk across the bridge to Mexico. Id. at 681. 
A year and a half later, he tried to return to the United States where he was apprehended and 
again charged with illegal reentry. Id.  
 151.  Id. at 681. 
 152.  Id. at 679 n.320; see also Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 2005 (2013) (discussing Guerrero’s case).  
 153.  Administrative procedures such as “expedited removal,” or “reinstatement of removal” 
permit removals without a hearing. Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration 
Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 181 (2017) (“[C]ritiques of immigration adjudication are 
incomplete and understated because they have failed to account for the following reality: the vast 
majority of persons ordered removed never step foot inside a courtroom.”); Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 2 
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highly limited,154 and those who accept “voluntary departure” do not 
have an immigration hearing prior to removal. Formal removal 
proceedings may also be denied to noncitizens without legal permanent 
resident status who have been convicted of an “aggravated felony.”155 
There are few safeguards to ensure that those removed are legally 
removable, much less removal priorities. 
B. Detainers that Lack Probable Cause  
The targeted-enforcement theory presupposes that the screening 
process identifies those who are removable. It treats checking 
immigration status as akin to the process of checking for an outstanding 
warrant. But immigration detainers differ from criminal warrants in 
key respects. Immigration officials are taken at their word that they 
have probable cause because no judicial process accompanies the 
issuance of a detainer. The result is that detainers issued en masse in 
the jailhouse may be unsupported by probable cause. 
Checking for immigration status is not like using a fingerprint 
comparison to check for prior criminal history or an outstanding 
criminal arrest warrant, given that there is no national database of 
citizens.156 The use of databases to issue immigration detainers 
oversimplifies immigration status determinations. The sole purpose of 
a warrant is to “mark” an arrested individual and to permit law 
enforcement agencies to track her prior contacts with the criminal 
justice system over time.157 Immigration status, on the other hand, is 
 
(2014) (“In 2013, the majority of people deported never saw a courtroom or immigration judge. 
Instead, the Department of Homeland Security quickly removed them via programs termed 
‘expedited removals’, ‘administrative removals’, and ‘reinstatement of removal orders.’”). 
 154.  Those subject to expedited removal include noncitizens arriving at the border and 
noncitizens who enter the country without inspection and are unable to demonstrate they have 
been physically present in the country for two years. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2018). The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that Congress may constitutionally limit judicial review of expedited removal 
orders in habeas corpus proceedings. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963–64 (2020). For 
a discussion of immigration habeas, see generally Neuman, supra note 52. 
 155.  8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (providing that the attorney general may develop truncated removal 
procedures for such noncitizens).  
 156.  Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]here is no national 
database of all U.S.-born citizens . . . . Similarly, ICE has never had access to any database of 
derivative or acquired citizens, because none exists.” (citation omitted)), rev’d in part, 975 F.3d 
788 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 157.  See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 123, at 644 (discussing how arrests “mark” 
individuals; the marking process “classifies subjects based on the statuses they have achieved 
through their contact with the police and courts”). 
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necessarily fluid—it is designed to change over time. The databases 
that immigration enforcement officials use do not reliably track 
changes in immigration status. Nor is there any good way to track 
immigration status under the complicated immigration statutory 
framework. Unlike notations about prior criminal histories or 
outstanding criminal warrants, immigration status determinations can 
be complex, both factually and legally.  
A recent class action, Gonzalez v. ICE,158 brought by U.S. citizen 
Geraldo Gonzalez,159 reveals how immigration databases lead to the 
risk of systemic Fourth Amendment violations. Gonzalez was arrested 
by the Los Angeles Police Department in December 2012, and an 
erroneous immigration detainer was lodged against him after a 
fingerprint database comparison.160 Gonzalez filed a class action 
challenging the practice of issuing detainers that are based solely on 
electronic database checks.161  
After a trial where evidence of the sufficiency of the databases was 
introduced, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California in May 2019 concluded that the “databases on which ICE 
relies for information on citizenship and immigration status often 
contain incomplete data, significant errors, or were not designed to 
provide information that would be used to determine a person’s 
removability.”162 The Gonzalez court held that the databases “reflect a 
person’s immigration status at a particular point in time, but [they] fail 
to reliably show how or whether that status has changed over time.”163 
In September 2020, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded to the 
district court for further review on the grounds that the district court’s 
ruling was based on a review of six of the databases used by DHS, but 
it needed to make factual findings about all of the databases.164 
Errors in the databases used by DHS are compounded when 
criminal law enforcement agencies rely on detainers for decisions 
about pretrial release or pleas. Part of the problem with relying on 
databases is that immigration status is not a bright-line delineation. It 
 
 158.  Gonzalez v. ICE, 975 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 159.  Id. at 797.  
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id. at 797, 800–01. 
 162.  Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2019). 
 163.  Id. at 1018. 
 164.  Gonzalez, 975 F.3d at 823. 
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can “occupy a gray area between lawful and unlawful.”165 Immigration 
scholar David Martin coined the term “twilight” immigration status to 
convey how immigration status changes over time.166 Annual quotas 
create backlogs of people unable to adjust their status in any given 
year—but some of those present without authorization will eventually 
obtain immigration status through family relationships with sponsoring 
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.167 Eagly similarly 
describes immigration status as existing along an alienage 
“spectrum,”168 with some who lack unauthorized status able to gain 
legal status at a later point in time.169 A record of a certain type of 
immigration status at one moment in time does not indicate 
immigration status at a later date.170  
Some who enter unlawfully subsequently normalize their 
immigration status, such as through executive or statutory mechanisms 
of relief. For instance, parole in place permits active-duty members of 
the U.S. armed forces to sponsor certain relatives for lawful 
immigration status in the United States.171 Unauthorized residents who 
are eligible for parole in place may adjust their status to become lawful 
 
 165.  HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 52 (2014). 
 166.  DAVID A. MARTIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., TWILIGHT STATUSES: A CLOSER 
EXAMINATION OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION 1 (2005), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/publications/MPI_PB_6.05.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS8E-T4W9] (describing how 
certain categories of those without formal legal status have claims to obtain lawful permanent 
resident status, such as through temporary protected status, and estimating that 1–1.5 million people 
who lack authorized immigration status may be able eventually to adjust their immigration status 
through family relationships).  
 167.  Id. at 2.  
 168.  Eagly, Criminal Justice, supra note 132, at 1137 (arguing that immigration status should 
be understood as a “spectrum” rather than as distinct categories of lawful or unlawful). 
 169.  In addition to relationships with sponsoring family members, some noncitizens may 
benefit from immigration legislation that normalizes immigration status. For instance, the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, provided for 
amnesty for over two million unauthorized migrants. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The 
Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 847–48 (2007) (“The United 
States has periodically regularized the status of many of the undocumented noncitizens living in 
the country through amnesties or other mechanisms.”). 
 170.  For instance, naturalization is available to lawful permanent residents who have resided 
in the United States for a minimum of five years, who meet other statutory criteria, such as 
demonstrating English proficiency, a knowledge of U.S. history and government, and who take 
an oath of allegiance to the United States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421–1423 (2018). 
 171.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (providing for “parole” for humanitarian reasons); 
Discretionary Options for Military Members, Enlistees and Their Families, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/military/discretionary-options-military-
members-enlistees-and-their-families [https://perma.cc/7VP8-JGXY]. 
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permanent residents and then may eventually become U.S. citizens. An 
accurate record of unlawful entry may not reflect legal removability.  
Immigration status determinations may require a detailed 
knowledge of facts and governing law.172 Even citizenship status 
determinations can be complex. Citizenship status can be obtained in 
three ways: through birth on U.S. soil,173 through the process of 
naturalization,174 and through birth to a U.S. citizen parent overseas.175 
Additionally, eligible children born abroad obtain “derivative 
citizenship” when their parents naturalize.176 Derivative citizenship 
status is not “obtained only by virtue of official recognition in the form 
of a certificate.”177 Since those who derive citizenship do not apply for 
citizenship themselves, they may be unaware of their own status.178 For 
citizens born overseas, proving citizenship may require various 
documents, such as their own birth certificate, their parents’ divorce 
certificate, or a parent’s certificate of naturalization.179 Even if there 
was a good way to track immigration status over time, the databases 
DHS relies on are not designed to track those changes. Evidence 
produced in the 2019 Gonzalez trial showed that immigration officials 
do not regularly update the databases to reflect changes in immigration 
 
 172.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (listing categories of people considered citizens at birth). 
 173.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 174.  8 U.S.C. § 1427. 
 175.  Id. § 1401. The statutory restrictions on obtaining birthright citizenship via a parental 
relationship will be discussed further in Part III. 
 176.  Id. § 1431(a) (providing for derivative citizenship).  
 177.  United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the 
government’s argument “that derivative citizenship is not automatically acquired at birth but 
must be applied for, and that it is obtained only by virtue of official recognition in the form of a 
certificate”). 
 178.  Conversely, some people with a U.S. citizen parent grow up believing they are U.S. 
citizens, only to find out when removal proceedings are initiated that they are not, in fact, U.S. 
citizens. See Kari E. Hong, Removing Citizens: Parenthood, Immigration Courts, and Derivative 
Citizenship, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 312, 314 (2014) (explaining how interior enforcement fails 
to capture derivative citizenship claims).  
 179.  Chau v. INS, 247 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing proof of citizenship where 
petitioner was able to establish that his father was a U.S. soldier who had been stationed in 
Vietnam, but could not establish the identity of the soldier); Rosenbloom, supra note 152, at 1968 
(“Citizenship claims based on descent often require would-be citizens to prove not only their 
parents’ or grandparents’ places of birth, but also that the relatives spent the requisite amount of 
time in the United States to convey citizenship to a child.”); Andy East, U.S. Citizen Jailed in 
Immigration Status Mistake, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2016/02/27/us-citizen-held-immigration-question [https://perma.cc/TJ9S-63L3] (discussing how a 
citizen born overseas offered various forms of documentation to establish his citizenship status).  
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status.180 The database comparisons treat immigration status as though 
it can be reduced to a bright-line determination, which leads to 
overbroad detainer determinations that are not actually supported by 
probable cause. 
Perhaps reliance on the databases could be justified if the database 
screening process was just one step in a larger, more reliable process. 
But that is not the case. Immigration arrest decisions contain far fewer 
safeguards against error than similar decisions in criminal law. Each 
immigration detainer is accompanied by an administrative warrant 
showing that there is probable cause that the target is removable.181 
Unlike criminal warrants, no judicial process accompanies 
administrative warrants.182  
Other safeguards against error in criminal law do not apply in 
immigration law. Suppose a local police officer stops someone 
suspected of unlawfully carrying a firearm and runs a criminal 
background check. The background check shows that the stopped 
individual has a prior felony conviction. The officer now has probable 
cause to arrest the individual on the charge of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm—a felony in most jurisdictions.183 If it turns out 
 
 180.  Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2019), rev’d in part, 975 F.3d 788 
(9th Cir. 2020). As a former deputy chief of staff for ICE explained in an expert report:  
DHS databases contain many errors, missing information, and inconsistent 
information. The information in the databases is only as reliable as the accuracy of the 
information being entered and the accuracy of its entry into the system. There are many 
sources of human error . . . . One issue is the entry of foreign names . . . . Another issue 
is misspellings. For example, “Gonzalez” could be entered as “Gonzales.” 
Amaya Report, supra note 3, at 14–15; see also Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 
IND. L.J. 1475, 1540 (2013) (discussing how biometric identification can be vulnerable to errors). 
 181.  ICE IMMIGRATION DETAINERS, supra note 29, at 2. 
 182.  In its initial rollout, Secure Communities issued detainers that dispensed with the 
probable cause requirement and issued detainers solely on the grounds “that an ‘investigation has 
been initiated’ into [the detained individual’s] immigration status.” Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. 
Supp. 3d 999, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (quoting Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11 C 5452, 2014 WL 
4911938, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014)). The government changed the detainer process to require 
a probable cause determination after a federal court found the practice unconstitutional. Id. at 
1009; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackmas County, No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11 
(D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation where county relied on an ICE 
detainer that did not provide probable cause regarding removability). In a 2017 enforcement 
policy memorandum, ICE described the policy of issuing civil administrative warrants with 
detainers as a reaction to the Moreno v. Napolitano opinion. ICE IMMIGRATION DETAINERS, 
supra note 29, at 2 n.2.  
 183.  A felony is commonly defined as an offense that is punishable by more than one year in 
prison. Felony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining felony as “[a] serious crime 
usu. punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death”). The facts in this 
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that the database was wrong—the suspect had never been convicted of 
a felony—the arrest was still lawful because it was supported by 
probable cause at the time of arrest. However, after the officer makes 
the arrest, other legal constraints play a role in safeguarding against 
error. The arrested individual is entitled to a hearing before a neutral 
magistrate—not before a prosecutor or anyone else from a law 
enforcement agency.184 The judge’s job is to review the facts of the 
arrest, make an independent probable cause determination, set bail, 
and appoint an attorney at no cost to the defendant if the defendant is 
indigent.185 The prosecutor also exercises discretion and makes an 
independent determination about whether to bring charges.186 The 
defense attorney should review the facts of the arrest, meet with the 
defendant, and argue for the defendant’s release. These constraints are 
intended to evaluate whether the arrest was actually supported by 
probable cause.  
These constraints too often fall short in fulfilling their purpose in 
the criminal justice system. But none of these protections even apply 
for probable cause determinations in the case of immigration arrests.187 
Suppose an officer checks a U.S. citizen’s immigration status, and a 
database erroneously shows that the individual has a prior removal 
order. Again, the database was wrong, and the arrested individual is 
actually a U.S. citizen. In the immigration case, there is no neutral 
magistrate review of the administrative warrant accompanying the 
immigration detainer. There is no right to appointed counsel if the 
defendant cannot afford one.188 And as in Brown’s case,189 the target of 
the detainer may not even have access to an immigration officer to 
 
hypothetical come from Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 195 (2008), where the arrested 
individual was charged with a felony because the arresting officer used an incorrect database to 
determine that he was a felon in possession of a firearm.  
 184.  Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). 
 185.  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). 
 186.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1250 (2020) 
(discussing how “progressive prosecutors” exercise charging discretion); Irene Oritseweyinmi 
Joe, Regulating Mass Prosecution, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1184–92 (2020) (analyzing how 
prosecutorial charging practices contribute to the overwhelming caseloads for indigent defense 
lawyers).  
 187.  INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (characterizing deportation as “a 
purely civil action” that does not trigger criminal procedure safeguards); Legomsky, supra note 
74, at 511–15 (discussing the courts’ “depiction of deportation as ‘civil’ and not punitive”). 
 188.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018) (providing the privilege of representation by counsel, but only 
“at no expense to the Government”). 
 189.  See supra notes 110–17 and accompanying text. 
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speak with about the error until being formally transferred to 
immigration custody—which could occur well after any decisions about 
bail or plea bargaining have taken place in the criminal case.  
There is relatively little data on how often DHS database errors 
result in inaccurate detention. DHS recently acknowledged that it 
lifted 6 percent of the immigration detainers issued in greater Los 
Angeles after determining that “the individuals were either U.S. 
citizens or otherwise not subject to removal.”190 This error rate is likely 
underinclusive because it only tracks errors that DHS itself has 
acknowledged, and because “sanctuary” policies adopted in Los 
Angeles limit compliance with ICE detainers.191 Other recent studies 
have also found systemic error. In Miami-Dade County, a hub of 
immigration enforcement, an investigation by the American Civil 
Liberties Union found that from February 2017 to February 2019, ICE 
ultimately canceled approximately 20 percent of the detainer requests 
because of evidence that the targets were not legally removable.192 It is 
only possible to conceptualize jailhouse screening as targeted by 
ignoring systemic inaccuracies and the toll they take on the detained 
population.  
C. Front-End Selection  
Jailhouse immigration screening focuses on a population that is 
particularly poorly situated to advocate on their own behalf to surface 
 
 190.  Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2019), rev’d in part, 975 F.3d 788 
(9th Cir. 2020). The court explained that:  
Data produced by ICE during the period of May 2015 to February 2016 reveals that of 
the 12,797 detainers issued during that time frame, 771 were lifted because the 
individuals were either U.S. citizens or otherwise not subject to removal . . . . Of those 
771 detainers lifted, 42 explicitly provide that the detainer was lifted because the 
individual was a U.S. citizen.  
Id. (citations omitted).  
 191.  News Release, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Local ICE Director Discusses Sanctuary 
Policy Impact on Public Safety (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/local-ice-
director-discusses-sanctuary-policy-impact-public-safety [https://perma.cc/CH9A-7E52] (stating 
that local law enforcement effectuated only five hundred out of eleven thousand detainers lodged 
in Los Angeles County in 2019). 
 192.  ACLU FLA., CITIZENS ON HOLD: A LOOK AT ICE’S FLAWED DETAINER SYSTEM IN 
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY 2–3 (2019), https://www.aclufl.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/aclufl_
report_-_citizens_on_hold_-_a_look_at_ices_flawed_detainer_system_in_miami-dade_county.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/28QE-UBW8] (citing data from Miami-Dade County “show[ing] that between 
February 2017 and February 2019, ICE sent the jail 420 detainer requests for people listed as U.S. 
citizens, only to later cancel 83 of those requests—evidently because the agency determined, after 
the fact, that its targets were in fact U.S. citizens”).  
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errors. Once arrested individuals are subject to criminal custody, 
factors such as poverty, isolation, lack of access to immigration papers, 
and mental illness affect the removal process.  
Travis Murphy, described as “homeless, uneducated, and 
illiterate,” by the federal court that reviewed his case, was convicted of 
drug trafficking charges.193 Immigration officials interviewed him, 
determined that he was a Jamaican national, and served him with a 
notice to appear at a removal hearing.194 Like most people in removal 
proceedings, Murphy appeared pro se.195 He had difficulty 
communicating; large portions of his testimony were “indiscernible.”196 
He denied being of Jamaican nationality and stated that he had been 
homeless in the United States for much of his life.197 During the 
removal hearing, the government produced no authenticated evidence 
that he was born in Jamaica, which meant that it was unable to meet its 
burden of proof.198 The jailed population is particularly likely to consist 
of individuals who have no ready access to documentation, like 
Murphy. Unlike Murphy, those deported without ever appearing at an 
immigration removal proceeding have no practical ability to hold the 
government to its burden of proof. 
Those in jail also face pronounced difficulty obtaining 
documentation. Immigration status is a legal status—it is not an 
evidentiary determination of guilt or innocence. For the minority of 
U.S. citizens who own passports and have them readily available, 
documenting immigration status may pose no problems.199 But for 
those in jail, even making a phone call to try to obtain documentation 
may be out of reach. A 2019 survey found rates as high as twenty-four 
dollars per minute for a call, with median ranges from six to fourteen 
 
 193.  Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 610, 612. 
 199.  As of 2020, approximately 43 percent of U.S. citizens owned passports. See Reports and 
Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2020), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/about-us/reports-
and-statistics.html [https://perma.cc/842E-N3RW] (reporting that there were 143,116,663 valid 
U.S. passports in circulation in 2020); U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/popclock [https://perma.cc/T7NQ-T9QF] (reporting the U.S. population 
was approximately 330.7 million at the end of 2020).  
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dollars per minute.200 Obtaining immigration paperwork itself is not 
cost free. Small dollar amounts—such as twenty-five dollars for a birth 
certificate—can be cost prohibitive for the poor.201 The administrative 
challenges of gathering paperwork from criminal custody may be 
prohibitively high. 
Seeking to establish citizenship or lawful immigration status is 
particularly difficult for those who experience mental illness. Pedro 
Guzman, a U.S. citizen with a long history of mental illness, was 
deported to Mexico after spending approximately a month in jail on 
charges of trespassing in a junkyard.202 His family only learned of his 
deportation after the fact.203 According to his family, Guzman did not 
display outward signs of a mental disability, but he was suspicious of 
strangers and could not read or write.204 Guzman was located three 
months after his deportation, after he made his way by foot over one 
hundred miles to the U.S.–Mexico border.205 
North Carolinian Mark Lyttle was arrested for a misdemeanor 
assault while receiving treatment in a psychiatric hospital.206 A prison 
official who apparently thought he looked Mexican filled out “Mexico” 
as his place of birth.207 (Lyttle’s family was from Puerto Rico.)208 That 
notation prompted an interview with two ICE agents who took Lyttle 
into custody and interrogated him without a witness present.209 The 
immigration agents concluded that “Mark Daniel Lyttle was an alias,” 
 
 200.  Press Release, Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, Prison Pol’y Initiative, State of Phone 
Justice: Local Jails, State Prisons, & Phone Providers (Feb. 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
phones/state_of_phone_justice.html [https://perma.cc/6ZTA-WCD8] (providing a national 
survey of telephone call rates from state prisons and jails).  
 201.  Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 747, 808 (2015) (“Even costs 
that may seem minor to some, such as $135 for a passport, or $25 for a birth certificate or marriage 
license, may be prohibitive for the indigent.”). 
 202.  Sam Quinones, Family of Deported Man Sues the U.S., L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2007, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-jun-12-me-deport12-story.html [https://perma.cc/27Z3-
4XVJ].  
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Randal C. Archibold, Deported in Error, Missing and Months Later Home, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 8, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/08/us/08border.html [https://perma.cc/YHB7-
HELB]. 
 206.  Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1269 (M.D. Ga. 2012). 
 207.  Complaint ¶ 31, Lyttle v. United States, 4:10-cv-142 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2010) 
[hereinafter Lyttle Complaint]. The form also listed his race as “Oriental.” Id. 
 208.  Lyttle, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. 
 209.  Id. 
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and that Lyttle was in fact a citizen of Mexico who had unlawfully 
entered the United States at age three.210 Lyttle had never completed 
high school and was functionally illiterate.211 Nonetheless, immigration 
officers required him to sign a document stipulating that “Lyttle” was 
not his actual name and that he was born in Mexico.212  
As a statutory matter, Lyttle was not entitled to an attorney at 
government expense, nor was he entitled to a mental competency 
proceeding at the time he was placed in immigration detention. No one 
contacted his family to allow them to provide evidence on his behalf.213 
He was transferred to immigration custody and detained for fifty-one 
days before being flown to the border, where he was forced to walk to 
Mexico with three dollars in his pocket.214 Lyttle spoke no Spanish and 
had no identification.215 He spent 125 days wandering through Mexico 
and Central America before making his way to a U.S. Embassy in 
Guatemala.216 Eventually, embassy officials investigated his citizenship 
status and arranged for his return to the United States.217  
As immigration screening has shifted to prisons and jails, it has 
resulted in disproportionate immigration screening of those who 
experience disability. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 14 
percent of state and federal prisoners and 26 percent of jail inmates 
meet the threshold for “serious psychological distress,” as compared to 
5 percent of the general population.218 The proportion is even higher 
for general mental illnesses.219 The targeted model assumes that those 
being screened are selected because they have engaged in conduct that 
is blameworthy. But these statistics reveal that criminal arrests 
systemically target those who may lack the ability to comport their 
 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. He was also bipolar and had spent much of his life receiving psychiatric treatment. 
Id. 
 212.  Id. at 1272. 
 213.  Lyttle Complaint, supra note 207, ¶ 56. 
 214.  Lyttle, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1266. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  BJS Finds That Inmates Have a Higher Rate of Serious Psychological Distress than the 
General U.S. Population, U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (June 22, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/imhprpji1112pr.cfm [https://perma.cc/WCN5-6BWA].  
 219.  Laura I. Appleman, Deviancy, Dependency, and Disability: The Forgotten History of 
Eugenics and Mass Incarceration, 68 DUKE L.J. 417, 463 (2018) (noting that “56 percent of state 
prisoners, 45 percent of federal prisoners, and 64 percent of jail inmates suffer from mental health 
issues”). 
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conduct with criminal law. Relying on criminal arrest as a filter for 
immigration screening necessarily means that immigration screening 
targets some of the most vulnerable members of our society—due to 
factors such as poverty and disability—and it imposes screening in an 
isolated setting where there are few safeguards against error. 
III.  A PUNITIVE MODEL OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL  
The rationale for engaging in jailhouse screening is a convergence 
of interests in immigration and criminal law; the stated aim of federal 
immigration officials is to use information gathered in the jailhouse to 
identify those who should be prioritized for deportation after they have 
finished serving their sentence. But what jailhouse screening reveals is 
how carceral interests subsume the government’s interest in building 
the polity. It is not possible for immigration screening to rely on 
criminal arrest without also reproducing the racial and class-based 
disparities underlying those arrests. As a result, policing decisions 
broker membership in the polity, rather than core immigration 
considerations about actual legal status, ties to the United States, and 
length of residence in the United States. This Part argues that jailhouse 
immigration screening resuscitates a punitive approach to immigration 
enforcement, and it argues that this approach undermines core aims of 
immigration law.  
A. Magnifying the Socioracial Biases of Criminal Arrest  
When immigration enforcement is linked to the process of 
criminal arrest, it overwhelmingly screens a population arrested for 
low-level offenses. At a rate of thirteen million cases filed per year, 
misdemeanor arrests outnumber felony arrests by a ratio of four to 
one.220 While there is no single misdemeanor system, and arrest 
practices vary across jurisdictions, a significant number of 
misdemeanor arrests are for quality-of-life offenses. As Professor 
Alexandra Natapoff observes, offenses such as loitering or disorderly 
conduct “don’t even look much like crimes.”221 Criminal arrest 
 
 220.  Sandra G. Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors by the Numbers, 61 B.C. L. 
REV. 971, 975 (2020) (“There are approximately thirteen million misdemeanor cases filed each 
year, representing more than three-quarters of all criminal cases.”). 
 221.  NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 3 (emphasis omitted) (noting that “[i]n twenty-five states, 
speeding is a misdemeanor,” and that the category of “quality-of-life offenses” includes behaviors 
such as “[l]oitering, spitting, [and] disorderly conduct”).  
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practices for common, broadly defined behaviors systemically reflect 
factors other than culpability, such as poverty, mental illness, and 
race.222  
In well-documented cases, domestic police engage in racial 
profiling for purposes of immigration enforcement. The Maricopa 
County Sheriff’s Office engaged in an “office-wide policy and practice 
to detain and arrest [Latino persons] believed to be within the United 
States without authorization, even when no state charges could be 
brought against such persons.”223 In Maricopa, racial profiling was 
programmatic behavior by the police—it was part of an organized 
strategy of law enforcement to target those suspected of lacking lawful 
immigration status.224 This policing behavior, the targeted drivers 
contended, was partially a product of police responding to “racially 
charged citizen requests.”225 By relying on criminal arrest as a screening 
device, immigration officials incorporate all of the race- and class-
based selection biases underlying criminal arrest.226  
 
 222.  Id. at 10 (highlighting the U.S. criminal justice system’s “ignominious history of 
punishing the poor” and people of color). 
 223.  Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 2783715, at *2 (D. Ariz. 
May 13, 2016); Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1000–02 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding preliminary 
injunction preventing the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office from detaining Latino motorists 
“based solely on reasonable suspicion or knowledge that a person was unlawfully present in the 
United States”). 
 224.  Cf. Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-
and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 165 (2015) (explaining that many 
young men of color do not experience police stops as “one-off investigative incident[s]” but rather 
as repetitive encounters based on high volume stops).  
 225.  Melendres, 695 F.3d at 995 (“Plaintiffs . . . contend[ed] that undisputed evidence 
established that the Defendants racially profiled Latinos when conducting their crime-
suppression sweeps in response to racially charged citizen requests.”). For an additional 
discussion of immigrants racially profiled as criminals, see Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing 
Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173, 
199–200 (2019) (describing how, after an influx of Somali immigrants to the largely white 
township of the town of Faribault, Minnesota, police officials attributed increased crime reports 
to cultural clashes with new Somali residents, as opposed to actual crime). 
 226.  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 572–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (summarizing 
the most “uncontested statistics” that 80 percent of an estimated 4.4 million Terry stops were of 
racial minorities); Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. 
L. REV. 731, 769 (2018) (providing data of “highly consistent and persistent patterns” of “large 
and persistent racial disparity in arrest rates across most offense types”); see also Devon W. 
Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 
1494 (2016) (describing how calls to the police for public order offenses like loitering increased 
during a period of racial integration and gentrification); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and 
Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 46–47 (2009) (discussing the “perceived racial borders” 
enforced by police when “law-abiding minorities entering predominantly white neighborhoods 
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Jailhouse screening builds upon a criminal enforcement system 
that reflects power disparities between vulnerable residents and the 
police. The criminal arrest process systematically permits police to 
target people who are perceived as undesirable and who lack the ability 
to contest criminal arrest. To give one troubling example, in 2010, a 
federal court determined that New York City police officers had 
arrested hundreds of homeless individuals on a defunct panhandling 
law.227 Police officers had relied on “cheat sheets” to figure out how 
they could arrest a population they perceived as undesirable.228 
Decades after the panhandling law was struck down, those cheat sheets 
remained in circulation and were used for arrest.229 The police defined 
the law in practice, regardless of the actual law on the books.  
Although criminal law is supposed to offer the most robust 
protections against government overreach, the process in 
misdemeanor courts systemically fails to provide access to adjudication 
and to hold the government to its burden of proof.230 In Professor 
Malcolm Feeley’s now-classic study of misdemeanor courts, in not a 
single one of the 1,640 misdemeanor cases sampled did the defendant 
receive a trial.231 This approach continues today in misdemeanor courts 
around the country.232 The misdemeanor process ends in a plea bargain 
 
are frequently stopped and questioned as to the reason for their presence in the neighborhood”); 
Ben Poston & Cindy Chang, LAPD Searches Blacks and Latinos More. But They’re Less Likely 
To Have Contraband than Whites, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-lapd-searches-20190605-story.html [https://perma.cc/BM4T-W8CX] (noting 
that “Blacks and Latinos were more than three times as likely as whites to be removed from the 
vehicle and twice as likely to either be handcuffed or detained at the curb” by police officers as 
compared to white drivers). 
 227.  Casale v. Kelly, 710 F. Supp. 2d 347, 352, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 228.  Id. at 356–57 (explaining how police officers systematized unlawful arrests by carrying 
“cheat sheets” that explained how they could paper their decisions to arrest homeless 
individuals). 
 229.  Id. at 357 (noting that an investigation by the city of New York, prompted by a class 
action lawsuit, found “nearly 1,400 cheat sheets containing the void laws”).  
 230.  Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953, 956–60 
(2018) (discussing delays in misdemeanor processing and watered-down procedural protections 
that compromise the efficacy of criminal procedure); Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 17, at 
1358–59. 
 231.  MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 9–11 (1979).  
 232.  Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 17, at 1329 (explaining that “little has changed since 
Feeley’s study”).  
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or a dismissal, but rarely in adjudication.233 Defendants often have to 
endure lengthy delays and repeated court dates if they seek their day 
in court.234 The process of arrest and confinement is not labeled as 
punishment, but from the perspective of the arrested individual, it is 
experienced as punishment.235 
Jailhouse immigration screening does not trigger formal 
punishment—no one is sentenced to serve a prison term for civil 
immigration violations—but it has a pronounced punitive effect. In 
some respects, jailhouse immigration screening resuscitates an 
approach that is actually worse than the law at issue in Wong Wing.236 
In Wong Wing, the Court held that a noncitizen could not be sentenced 
to imprisonment for violating civil immigration laws.237 If Congress 
chose to punish civil immigration violations, it had to do so through the 
criminal law.238 The Court assumed that noncitizens would have access 
to an adjudicatory process.239 But in the jailhouse, targeted individuals 
too often have access to none. The targets of jailhouse immigration 
screening are merely suspected of being removable; they have not been 
adjudicated removable. They are merely suspected of committing 
crime; they have not yet been convicted of anything. Jailhouse 
 
 233.  Besiki L. Kutateladze & Victoria Z. Lawson, Is a Plea Really a Bargain? An Analysis of 
Plea and Trial Dispositions in New York City, 64 CRIME & DELINQ. 856, 869 (2018) (finding that 
more than half of New York misdemeanor cases were disposed by plea agreements, and almost 
an additional quarter were dismissed).  
 234.  Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 123, at 611 (explaining that in New York misdemeanor 
cases, “[a]mong those cases that continued past arraignment, the mean age of the docket at 
disposition . . . ha[d] ranged from 85.1 to 112.7 days over the past ten years”).  
 235.  See generally NATAPOFF, supra note 18 (conceptualizing the misdemeanor system as 
imposing “punishment without crime”). See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: 
Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. SOCIO. 351, 351 (2013). For important studies of 
misdemeanors, see generally FEELEY, supra note 231 (describing a degrading process of being 
subjected to procedural hassle in misdemeanor court) and ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, 
MISDEMEANORLAND (2019). Both Feeley and Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann employ the 
concept of a “managerial” system that manages defendants through contact with the criminal 
justice system. FEELEY, supra note 231, at 7–11; KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra, at 4–5.  
 236.  Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233–34 (1896). 
 237.  Id. at 237. The defendants had been ordered deported, and had been sentenced to hard 
labor before their deportation was effectuated. Id. at 235.  
 238.  Id. (“But to declare unlawful residence within the country to be an infamous crime, 
punishable by deprivation of liberty and property, would be to pass out of the sphere of 
constitutional legislation, unless provision were made that the fact of guilt should first be 
established by a judicial trial.”). 
 239.  See id. at 236–37 (“It is not consistent with the theory of our government that the 
legislature should, after having defined an offence as an infamous crime, find the fact of guilt and 
adjudge the punishment by one of its own agents.”).  
JAIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2021  8:05 PM 
2021] JAILHOUSE IMMIGRATION SCREENING 1745 
screening permits race-based biases about criminal culpability to drive 
the immigration enforcement system but conceals the work that race-
based selection is doing. By assuming that people deserve to be 
screened because they are in the jailhouse, we ignore factors other than 
criminal culpability that lead to their being arrested.  
This approach comes at an enormous cost to overpoliced racial 
minorities. Commentators have at times invoked the language of 
citizenship and immigration law to convey the harm caused by race-
based policing.240 In her dissent in Utah v. Strieff,241 Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor put it this way: “[U]nlawful ‘stops’ have severe 
consequences much greater than the inconvenience suggested by the 
name . . . . When we condone officers’ use of these devices without 
adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an 
arbitrary manner. We also risk treating members of our communities 
as second-class citizens.”242 Justice Sotomayor dissented from the 
majority’s decision holding that evidence discovered in an unjustified 
police stop is still admissible.243 By invoking the language of 
immigration law, Justice Sotomayor conveyed how racialized police 
stops and arrests shape an entire community’s relationship with the 
government. Justice Sotomayor concluded that the majority opinion 
“implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a 
carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.”244 
Justice Sotomayor’s concern was with how overbroad police stops 
can compromise freedom of movement and individual liberty. 
Professor Monica Bell makes a similar point, arguing that a large body 
of cross-disciplinary research “suggests that [poor people of color] 
often see themselves as essentially stateless—unprotected by the law 
and its enforcers and marginal to the project of making American 
society.”245 Overpoliced communities receive a message of “profound 
 
 240.  See, e.g., Paul Butler, Walking While Black; Encounters with the Police on My Street; 
Points of View, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 1997 (analogizing a police stop in the author’s neighborhood to 
a demand to show a pass card in apartheid South Africa); Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the 
Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 955–57 (2002) (describing the author’s own 
experience of being subject to racial profiling by police). 
 241.  Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
 242.  Id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 243.  Id. at 2064 (majority opinion). 
 244.  Id. at 2070–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 245.  Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE 
L.J. 2054, 2057 (2017); see also I. Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 653, 655 (2018) (arguing that the Court’s policing jurisprudence conveys that a 
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estrangement” where “large swaths of American society . . . see 
themselves as anomic, subject only to the brute force of the state while 
excluded from its protection.”246  
At a time when there is growing questioning of how police surveil 
and control racial minorities within the United States, it is crucial to 
recognize how jailhouse immigration screening magnifies the already-
degrading experience of low-level arrests. Jailhouse immigration 
screening signals to overpoliced communities that the government 
rightfully engages in surveillance, and that those subject to criminal 
arrest should be viewed as potentially worthy of expulsion from the 
country. Jailhouse screening, combined with inadequate procedure, 
quite literally risks creating “second-class” citizens, regardless of their 
actual citizenship status or ties to the polity. 
B. Undermining Immigration Law Objectives  
Jailhouse screening ultimately undercuts the ability of 
immigration enforcement officials to adhere to a targeted-enforcement 
approach. The targeted approach rests on the premise that removal 
decisions should not only be legally justified, but that they should also 
reflect the reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Jailhouse 
screening, however, systemically opens the door to enforcement 
against those who are not legally removable as well as those who do 
not fall within stated removal priorities. Recognizing how jailhouse 
screening creates risks of targeting those meant to be on the “inside” 
of immigration law offers a way to recognize deeper structural 
problems with government overreach in the context of immigration 
enforcement.  
To employ political theorist Michael Walzer’s influential analogy, 
immigration law operates akin to an admissions policy in a university 
or a membership club.247 Immigration law delineates those who are on 
 
“good citizen” ought to be willing to surrender constitutional rights and submit to police searches 
and questioning).  
 246.  Bell, supra note 245, at 2057.  
 247.  MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 36–42 (1983) (developing an analogy between 
immigration admission policies and neighborhoods, clubs, families, and universities); David 
Miller, Immigration: The Case for Limits, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 363, 
368–72 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2d ed. 2014) (analyzing Walzer’s 
analogy of immigration law as admission to a membership club). 
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the “inside” of the community and those who are not,248 and it also 
dictates the terms of admission. The rationale is to create a bounded 
national community with a particular character. The laws that 
determine admissions, status changes, and removal construct the 
parameters of membership in the United States. Deportation is not the 
aim of immigration law itself, but is one tool the government uses to 
effectuate membership decisions. Immigration laws can 
simultaneously serve any number of ends—building a workforce or 
uniting families, for instance—but the decision to deport should be 
justified by substantive, procedural, and equitable considerations.  
Deportation should accurately reflect immigration and citizenship 
status determinations; any legitimate immigration enforcement system 
must be able to recognize its own members. Adequate procedure plays 
a gatekeeping role in distinguishing those who are legally removable 
from those who are not. As Professor Rachel Rosenbloom notes, in 
Kwock Jan Fat v. White,249 issued during the period of Chinese 
Exclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated its own version of the 
Blackstone principle for immigration cases: “It is better that many 
Chinese immigrants should be improperly admitted than that one 
natural born citizen of the United States should be permanently 
excluded from his country.”250 Courts have recognized that 
immigration officials should be “just as zealous in making sure that 
U.S. citizens were not unlawfully removed from the United States as 
they were in making sure that illegal immigrants were excluded.”251  
Just as criminal prosecutions should reflect an interest in “doing 
justice,” ICE arrests and prosecutions should also reflect a 
commitment to building the polity by recognizing membership claims. 
Undocumented activists, drawing on earlier civil rights movements, 
have argued that deportations are wrongful in a normative sense—
despite being accurate and supported by adequate evidence—when 
 
 248.  Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1062–65 (1994) (discussing the “inside” and “outside” distinction in 
immigration reflecting “the terms in which the judiciary has justified its immigration law 
exceptionalism over the past century” and arguing that the distinction is deeply problematic).  
 249.  Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920). 
 250.  Id. at 464; Rosenbloom, supra note 152, at 1990. The Blackstone formulation is typically 
described as: “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1763). 
 251.  Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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they fail to recognize longstanding ties to the United States.252 Some 
have publicly declared their undocumented status and challenged the 
government to deport them.253 This “radical form of transparency” 
seeks to force the government to articulate why deportation serves a 
stated immigration law objective.254 The aim is to show that the 
problem is not with those who lack lawful immigration status, but with 
an immigration law that fails to recognize their ties to the polity or 
permits them to normalize their status.255 The government lacks the 
moral authority to engage in deportation, even if it claims the legal 
authority to do so.  
Jailhouse screening has been conceptualized by immigration 
officials as making the process of removal more transparent. This 
approach is designed to make removal decisions that better reflect 
underlying equitable commitments. When Secure Communities was 
renamed the Priority Enforcement Program, Obama administration 
officials identified the goal of promoting “public confidence in our 
enforcement activities.”256 In theory, if we can see who the executive 
prioritizes for removal, we can evaluate whether removals actually fit 
those priorities. This approach, in principle, permits the public to 
mobilize the political process to seek outcomes that are fairer and more 
just. But because jailhouse screening is dependent on the criminal 
arrest process, it is not achieving the aim of channeling discretion in a 
transparent manner. Instead, it risks systemic enforcement against 
those who have compelling claims to remain.  
For a noncitizen, the significance of deportation depends in part 
on the noncitizen’s ties to the United States and the stakes involved in 
removal. As the Court recognized in Padilla, deportation can function 
as a punishment for longtime noncitizens,257 depending on factors such 
 
 252.  For a discussion of movement lawyering and immigration reform efforts, see Sameer M. 
Ashar, Movement Lawyers in the Fight for Immigrant Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1464, 1495–1506 
(2017) and Marisol Orihuela, Crim-Imm Lawyering, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 613, 628 (2020). 
 253.  Jose Antonio Vargas, Why I Turned Myself in to DHS, POLITICO MAG. (Sept. 8, 2014), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/obamas-deferred-action-on-deportations-110737 
[https://perma.cc/48EF-TZW5].  
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Professor Hiroshi Motomura has argued for “adopting a view of immigration as 
transition” and to recognize “new immigrants as Americans in waiting.” Hiroshi Motomura, Who 
Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of Americans in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 359, 367 (2012).  
 256.  Detention and Removal Priorities Memorandum, supra note 94, at 1.  
 257.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010).  
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as length of presence in the United States and ties to their country of 
origin. For too many noncitizens, deportation lacks any principles of 
proportionality and fails to recognize underlying ties and contributions 
to the polity.258  
For a citizen, deportation is the legal equivalent of a wrongful 
conviction; it is a form of criminal punishment—namely, banishment. 
A body of constitutional law limits Congress’s ability to strip 
citizenship through civil proceedings.259 In Trop v. Dulles,260 the Court 
held that Congress had no authority to strip citizenship from a U.S. 
soldier who was convicted of a single day’s desertion during wartime.261 
The Court determined that denaturalization constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment on the facts of the 
case.262 Five years later, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,263 the Court 
likewise held that denationalization following an act of military 
desertion constituted punishment, and could only be imposed if the 
defendant was offered the full range of constitutional safeguards that 
accompany the criminal justice process.264  
The Court has articulated a number of rationales for limiting 
Congress’s ability to strip citizenship. From the perspective of political 
contract theory, citizenship status can be conceptualized as a 
preconstitutional political contract between individuals and their 
government: “This Government was born of its citizens, it maintains 
itself in a continuing relationship with them, and, in my judgment, it is 
without power to sever the relationship that gives rise to its 
 
 258.  See generally Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009) 
(arguing that deportation lacks a proportionality principle). 
 259.  Naturalized citizens may have their citizenship status stripped away only if the 
government can establish that citizenship was obtained by fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1425 (2018) 
(prohibiting the “[p]rocurement of citizenship or naturalization unlawfully”); 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) 
(2018) (providing for denaturalization when a citizen has been convicted of knowing procurement 
of naturalization by fraud). The government has the burden of proving fraud in the acquisition of 
citizenship, and “the facts and the law should be construed as far as is reasonably possible in favor 
of the citizen.” Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943). For a critique of civil 
denaturalization procedures as being too lax, see generally Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina 
D. Manta, (Un)civil Denaturalization, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 402, 402, 452–61 (2019) (arguing “that 
stripping Americans of citizenship through the route of civil litigation . . . violates substantive and 
procedural due process”). 
 260.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 261.  Id. at 92. 
 262.  Id. at 86. 
 263.  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
 264.  Id. at 165.  
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existence.”265 In Afroyim v. Rusk,266 the Court put it this way: The 
“citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry. The very nature 
of our free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule 
of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive 
another group of citizens of their citizenship.”267  
One rationale for curtailing Congress’s ability to strip citizenship 
is to minimize the risk of uncertainty about whether a citizen’s conduct 
might result in deportation. Justice William Brennan’s concurrence in 
Mendoza-Martinez argued that stripping citizenship from those who 
engage in egregious misconduct could also open the door to potentially 
removing citizens who refuse “to pay taxes, to do jury duty, to testify, 
to vote.”268 Similarly, in Trop, Chief Justice Earl Warren’s plurality 
opinion stated that “[c]itizenship is not a license that expires upon 
misbehavior . . . citizenship is not lost every time a duty of citizenship 
is shirked. And the deprivation of citizenship is not a weapon that the 
Government may use to express its displeasure at a citizen’s conduct, 
however reprehensible that conduct may be.”269  
This body of constitutional doctrine is also intended to protect the 
most vulnerable citizens from having their status stripped away and to 
guard individuals from the risk of government overreach. In Afroyim, 
the Court held that Congress has no authority to “forcibl[y] destr[oy] 
. . . citizenship” status, and it held that “the Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against 
a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his 
creed, color, or race.”270  
Constitutional doctrine is thus deeply protective of citizens who 
are recognized as on the “inside” of immigration law. If the “country is 
its citizenry,” then immigration enforcement procedures that subject 
vulnerable residents to extended carceral treatment reveal a core 
failure of immigration administration. If jailhouse immigration 
screening creates the risk of detaining citizens, then there is little 
reason to believe that it does a good job of “targeting” enforcement in 
 
 265.  Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Perez v. Brownell 
was overturned by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967), and Chief Justice Earl Warren’s 
dissenting opinion in Perez formed the basis for the majority opinion in Afroyim.  
 266.  Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
 267.  Id. at 268.  
 268.  Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 196 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 269.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92–93 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 270.  Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268. 
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a way that takes into account substantive, procedural, and equitable 
claims of noncitizens to remain in the country.  
In the context of jailhouse immigration screening, there is already 
evidence that removals fail to comport with articulated federal 
enforcement priorities. Many of those removed after the rollout of 
Secure Communities did not fall into any stated removal priorities.271 
But more fundamentally, the absence of procedural protections within 
the jailhouse creates reason to doubt whether the category of “criminal 
alien” has meaning—whether it actually reflects underlying criminal 
culpability or legal removability. Jailhouse screening magnifies the 
potential for government overreach already inherent in domestic 
policing and extends it to decisions about removal. Put differently, in 
service of policing a boundary between members and nonmembers, 
jailhouse screening shifts that boundary in a way that excludes 
overpoliced racial minorities most likely to be stereotyped as 
undocumented.272 Immigration enforcement decisions reflect domestic 
policing practices rather than the removal priorities articulated by the 
federal government. 
IV.  UNCOUPLING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT FROM THE 
JAILHOUSE 
This Part turns to reform. Without a major change in either arrest 
practices or immigration law, it is not possible to conduct immigration 
screening in the jailhouse without importing carceral interests into 
immigration enforcement. If jailhouse immigration screening does not 
actually succeed at targeting immigration enforcement—if it instead 
imposes additional jailtime and creates new risks of removing those 
who are not legally removable, much less removal priorities—then it 
should be discontinued. This Part argues for ending jailhouse 
immigration screening and explains why other commonly proposed 
changes, such as modifying detainers or employing “sanctuary” 
policies, will not remedy the defects of jailhouse immigration 
screening. If jailhouse screening persists, it should be accompanied by 
 
 271.  See Cox & Rodríguez, Immigration Law Redux, supra note 4, at 188–91 (showing how 
the Morton Memos did not initially increase removals that fell within federal priorities and 
explaining that the discrepancy may have been due to “an enforcement-oriented and results-
driven institutional culture” amongst immigration agents).  
 272.  Cf. Asad L. Asad, Latinos’ Deportation Fears by Citizenship and Legal Status, 2007–
2018, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 8836, 8836–37 (2020) (finding that the deportation fears of 
Latino U.S. citizens increased during the Trump administration, due to growing awareness of the 
deportation policy after the 2016 election).  
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front-end procedural protections that more closely resemble those of 
criminal procedure. Improved procedures are no substitute for 
uncoupling from the jailhouse altogether; they will do little to address 
racial biases underlying arrest decisions or the risk of heightened 
detention based on suspected immigration status. But they represent 
an improvement from the current approach because they offer a way 
to hold the government to its burden of proof. One particularly 
important change is to adopt neutral review of immigration detainers.  
A. Uncoupling Immigration Screening from the Process of  
Criminal Arrest  
Immigration officials cannot rely on criminal arrest as a front-end 
screening device without fundamentally altering how immigration 
enforcement unfolds. Without a significant change in either the size of 
the undocumented population or in policing practices, criminal arrest 
should not be used for immigration screening. Common policy 
proposals that fall short of uncoupling immigration screening from 
criminal arrests will do little to address a process that permits front-end 
detention based on suspected immigration status. They will not alter 
the mechanics of underlying arrest decisions or the front-end influence 
of immigration detainers on the criminal justice process.  
One reform proposal is to end the use of the current immigration 
detainers and to reinstate “notification only” immigration detainers.273 
The Obama administration adopted this approach when it replaced 
Secure Communities with the Priority Enforcement Program.274 A 
“notification only” detainer does not request that the jail hold the 
detained individual for any additional time.275 It instead requests that 
the immigration officials be notified prior to the arrested individual’s 
release from criminal custody. This approach, however, does nothing 
to prevent bail denial or to limit the adverse impact that detainers have 
 
 273.  Testimony presented during the Gonzalez trial indicated that DHS switched from 
notification only detainers to the current detainers that request two days additional jailtime in 
1997. Gonzalez Brief, supra note 147, at 7–8. DHS switched back to notification only detainers 
between 2015–2017, and then reinstated the detainers that seek two days additional detention. Id. 
at 8. 
 274.  See Detention and Removal Priorities Memorandum, supra note 94, at 6 (establishing 
priorities effective January 5, 2015).  
 275.  Garcia v. Taylor, 40 F.3d 299, 304 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that an immigration detainer 
is not a request that a warden “hold a petitioner”); Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 594 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (noting that a detainer is “for notification purposes only”). 
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on the criminal plea–bargaining process. “Notification only” detainers 
still cede significant discretion to the police to set the agenda for 
immigration enforcement.  
“Sanctuary” or “immigrant protective” policies will also not 
address the defects in jailhouse immigration screening. “Sanctuary” is 
an umbrella term for a body of distinct practices that may include 
noncooperation with immigration detainers.276 These policies, while 
significant on the local level, are not a solution for a program with a 
national scope. Noncooperation policies create some additional costs 
for the federal government in conducting immigration screening in 
certain jails, but those costs will likely lead the government to shift 
resources to other jurisdictions that comply with detainers. In addition, 
localities have significant discretion in how they rely on detainers. 
Some “sanctuary” jurisdictions have adopted selective noncooperation 
policies, with local law enforcement complying with detainers if the 
defendant is charged with a felony or with a violent crime.277 The 
approach still gives local law enforcement agencies the power to use 
immigration detainers as markers when it serves their own institutional 
objectives. Sanctuary is not tantamount to ending jailhouse screening. 
Shifting to criminal convictions rather than criminal arrests has the 
potential to reduce the impact of immigration screening in the 
jailhouse, but much depends on how the approach is implemented. As 
of January 2021, the Biden administration revoked the Trump 
administration’s immigration enforcement memoranda and 
announced a review of civil immigration enforcement priorities.278 The 
Biden administration may take an approach that resembles the Obama 
administration’s decision to end Secure Communities and replace it 
 
 276.  See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 
2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1199, 1205 (observing that the modern sanctuary movement differs 
in important ways from its namesake in the church-led sanctuary movement of the 1980s); Eagly, 
Immigrant Protective Policies, supra note 14, at 300–01, 301 n.303 (discussing sanctuary policies); 
Christopher N. Lasch, R. Linus Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina Francesca Haynes, Annie Lai, 
Elizabeth M. McCormick & Juliet P. Stumpf, Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 
1703, 1736–52 (2018) (outlining several different categories of sanctuary policy).  
 277.  Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies, supra note 14, at 301 & n.304 (explaining that 
sanctuary policies may include exceptions that permit the reporting of individuals charged with 
felonies). 
 278.  Memorandum from David Pekoske, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Troy 
Miller, Senior Off. Performing the Duties of the Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., 
Review of and Interim Revision to Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and 
Priorities (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0120_enforcement-
memo_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/37KN-JSYE].  
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with the Priority Enforcement Program.279 The Obama 
administration’s decision to relaunch jailhouse screening in the form of 
the Priority Enforcement Program was driven in part by the perception 
that the program compromised local law enforcement relationships 
with immigrant communities. When ending Secure Communities, 
then-DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson stated “Secure Communities 
remains in my view a valid and important law enforcement objective, 
but a fresh start and a new program are necessary,” given evidence that 
the program created mistrust between immigrant communities and 
local law enforcement agencies that ultimately refused to comply with 
immigration detainers.280 An approach akin to the Priority 
Enforcement Program would shift to prioritizing enforcement against 
those with certain convictions, rather than on the basis of arrests as a 
general matter. Assuming line immigration officers exercise discretion 
in how detainers are issued in the first place,281 this approach may 
reduce the reach of the program. But if immigration officers issue 
detainers broadly at the time of arrest, then detainers will still create 
extended carceral treatment within the criminal justice system, 
regardless of whether immigration officials ultimately pursue removal.  
Even if a conviction-based approach reduces the reach of 
detainers, it continues to hand local law enforcement officials the 
power to manipulate criminal charges to maximize the likelihood of 
deportation. Prosecutors often wield considerable discretion in how 
they charge particular offenses, including with respect to collateral 
consequences such as deportation.282 Maricopa County, for instance, 
one of the largest jurisdictions for removals in the United States, has a 
well-documented policy of seeking to maximize the likelihood of 
deportation for noncitizens.283 Prosecutors describe this as a “no 
amnesty” approach, one that views deportation as a goal of the 
prosecution.284 Prosecutors who are aware of immigration status, and 
 
 279.  See Secure Communities Memorandum, supra note 94 (ending Secure Communities). 
 280.  Id. at 1. 
 281.  As Cox and Rodríguez have noted, the Obama administration encountered pronounced 
challenges in ensuring that line-level immigration agents adhered to federal priorities. Cox & 
Rodríguez, Immigration Law Redux, supra note 4, at 162, 190–91 (discussing how in an 
enforcement-driven culture, line agents may not adhere to executive enforcement priorities); see 
also ADAM B. COX & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, THE PRESIDENT AND IMMIGRATION LAW 170–
73 (2020).  
 282.  Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, supra note 74, at 1215–26 (discussing 
prosecutorial discretion and collateral consequences).  
 283.  Eagly, Criminal Justice, supra note 132, at 1188. 
 284.  Id. 
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who have the discretion to bring multiple criminal charges, either 
misdemeanors or felonies, may well choose to pursue felony 
convictions with the aim of securing deportation as a tangible 
prosecutorial goal. In other words, reliance on criminal convictions 
instead of arrests can incentivize criminal prosecutors to pursue 
convictions they would not otherwise pursue.  
Ultimately, linking immigration screening to the massive world of 
low-level criminal arrests creates a significant expansion in impact of a 
criminal arrest. Immigration removal decisions have a fundamentally 
different aim than the criminal justice system. If immigration law is 
about who belongs in the United States, it should not be coupled to a 
system designed to punish, particularly given the enormous toll the 
criminal justice system already exacts from communities of color. 
Criminal arrests do not offer any insight into key questions for 
immigration law, such as the nature and extent of any given individual’s 
ties to the polity. Immigration enforcement should uncouple from the 
jailhouse altogether.  
B. Front-End Procedural Protections 
If immigration screening in the jailhouse persists, it should be 
accompanied by more robust front-end procedural protections. In 
particular, to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment, detainers 
should be accompanied by a neutral probable cause determination. 
As a threshold matter, a local law enforcement agency must have 
probable cause before it can subject anyone to arrest. Constitutional 
criminal procedure governs the front-end rights of those accused of 
crimes. A 1975 decision, Gerstein v. Pugh,285 emphasized why criminal 
custody decisions may not be left to an individual officer’s discretion. 
It discussed the importance of a neutral and detached magistrate who 
reviews probable cause determinations.286 The goal is to “safeguard 
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy.”287 The 
standard acknowledges room for mistakes on the part of law 
enforcement but provides that mistakes must be “reasonable” and 
emphasizes that a single law enforcement officer’s judgment should be 
reviewed by an independent magistrate.288  
 
 285.  Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
 286.  Id. at 112. 
 287.  Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). 
 288.  Id. 
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It is well established that whenever an individual’s detention is 
extended solely on the basis of an immigration detainer, that 
constitutes a new arrest. This new arrest, in turn, must be supported by 
probable cause.289 The absence of meaningful front-end procedure 
creates a systemic risk that arrests are not actually supported by 
probable cause. In City of El Cenizo v. Texas,290 the Fifth Circuit cited 
the “collective-knowledge doctrine” as providing a sufficient basis for 
a local law enforcement arrest pursuant to an immigration detainer, at 
least in the case where state law provided authority for such an arrest.291 
The collective knowledge doctrine provides that “an officer initiating 
the stop or conducting the search need not have personal knowledge 
of the evidence that gave rise to the reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause, so long as he is acting at the request of those who have the 
necessary information.”292 The Fifth Circuit relied on the collective 
knowledge doctrine, in part, to strike down a facial challenge to a Texas 
law that barred local law enforcement agencies from refusing to 
cooperate with ICE detainers.293  
In applying the collective-knowledge doctrine, the Fifth Circuit 
assumed that a criminal law enforcement agency may rely on a federal 
civil law enforcement determination. But there are important 
differences between the civil and criminal contexts. Within a criminal 
law enforcement agency, officers have overlapping legal authority and 
expertise. A police officer who relies on information gathered by 
another police officer has the ability to make a threshold determination 
whether the information provided by the other officer, if correct, would 
establish probable cause. And both police officers have the 
independent authority to make a criminal arrest. But local law 
 
 289.  Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2018) (determining that the Fourth 
Amendment applied where “the facts reflect that [the arrested individual] continued to be 
detained after satisfying the bond requirements, solely because of suspicion that she might be 
illegally present in the United States”); Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 216–17 (1st Cir. 
2015) (holding that it is “beyond debate” that immigration officers “would need probable cause 
to arrest and detain individuals for the purpose of investigating their immigration status”). 
 290.  City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 291.  Id. at 187–88. In City of El Cenizo, the plaintiffs cited to Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 
N.E.3d 1143, 1157–58 (Mass. 2017), which held that state officials could only carry out civil 
immigration detainers if state law provided the authority to do so. City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 
188. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Lunn on the grounds that state authority in Texas did provide 
this authority. Id. at 188. 
 292.  City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 187. 
 293.  Id. 
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enforcement officials who rely on immigration detainers have no 
independent authority to make civil immigration arrests.294 Nor do they 
have training in immigration law. A local law enforcement officer who 
relies solely on a civil immigration officer’s assessment of probable 
cause is necessarily blind to some degree as to its basis. If it turns out 
that the immigration officer was wrong, then the criminal law 
enforcement agency has effected an arrest without probable cause.  
The Fifth Circuit drew a distinction between “blind obedience” to 
the detainer and cooperation with detainers. The court held that in 
cases where an arrested individual furnished identity evidence that 
negated the information in the detainer, the local law enforcement 
agency would have no obligation to honor the detainer. The court 
observed, “it is difficult to imagine what facts other than valid forms of 
identification would conclusively negate ICE’s probable cause 
determination.”295 The court’s approach, however, raises more 
questions than it answers. Jailed individuals do not approach with 
passports in hand. And there is no obligation for U.S. residents as a 
general matter to carry identification. The court’s approach assumes 
an underlying process for checking documentation and comparing it 
against detainers, but it does not explain what that process is or why it 
would be sufficient. 
In Hernandez v. United States,296 the Second Circuit held that the 
collective knowledge doctrine had no applicability where the 
immigration detainer was not, in fact, supported by probable cause.297 
There, the jailed individual was a U.S. citizen who was held pursuant 
to a detainer issued for an individual with a different name.298 The court 
held that “the name discrepancy alone is arguably enough to vitiate 
probable cause.”299 In addition, the jailed individual had informed 
multiple law enforcement officials of his U.S. citizenship status, all of 
 
 294.  Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 410 (2012) (“Congress has put in place a system 
in which state officers may not make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability 
except in specific, limited circumstances.”). 
 295.  City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 189. 
 296.  Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 297.  Id. at 209 (“There can be no collective knowledge, however, if the initiating officer 
lacked probable cause—i.e., in that event no other officer can rely on the information of the 
initiating officer.”). 
 298.  The jailed individual was Luis Hernandez; the detainer was issued for “Hernandez-
Martinez, Luis Enrique.” Id. at 197. 
 299.  Id. at 208. 
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whom refused to help. The court held that given the underlying name 
discrepancy, and given that the jailed individual’s status could have 
been “verified with minimal effort,” the local law enforcement agency 
engaged in a detention without probable cause.300 The approach in 
Hernandez assumes that jailhouse officials exercise their own judgment 
and do not blindly honor detainers, but it does not indicate how these 
officials should evaluate detainers. 
Where detainers trigger immediate consequences within the 
criminal justice system, the burden to come forward and dispute those 
immigration detainers should not rest on detained individuals 
themselves. This approach is backward. It is the law enforcement 
agency’s burden to establish probable cause for the arrest. And it is 
particularly problematic to put the burden of coming forward and 
disputing detainers on arrested individuals who are uniquely isolated, 
who have no ready access to documentation, and who have no readily 
apparent procedure to dispute the confinement.  
Immigration detainers implicate the core concerns with 
government overreach that were at issue in Gerstein. There, the Court 
held that once detained, an arrested individual’s “need for a neutral 
determination of probable cause increases significantly,” given the 
serious costs that arise from pretrial confinement.301 The Court held 
that “[w]hen the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a 
neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish 
meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty.”302 
The Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez held that Gerstein applies to 
immigration arrests and remanded the case to the district court for 
further proceedings.303 Neutral review of detainers is particularly 
important with jailhouse immigration screening, given the wide-
ranging impact detainers have within the jail and the systemic risk of 
front-end detention imposed without probable cause.  
In determining whether probable cause has been established, a 
core question is whether the process of immigration screening via 
biometric comparison itself meets the probable cause threshold. In 
2019, the district court in Gonzalez determined that ICE had violated 
 
 300.  Id.  
 301.  Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“Pretrial confinement may imperil the 
suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.”). 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  Gonzalez v. ICE, 975 F.3d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 2020). 
JAIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2021  8:05 PM 
2021] JAILHOUSE IMMIGRATION SCREENING 1759 
the Fourth Amendment “by relying on an unreliable set of databases 
to make probable cause determinations” and held that the databases 
contained “fatal” flaws, including that they were outdated and 
incomplete.304 The Ninth Circuit subsequently vacated and remanded 
the decision for additional fact finding, given that the district court had 
not issued findings of fact regarding the reliability of each of the sixteen 
databases used.305 One problem with database comparisons as the sole 
basis for issuing detainers—particularly in the absence of neutral 
review—is that law enforcement agencies have no way to validate 
whether the comparisons are accurate. This creates a systemic risk that 
jailed individuals will be denied pretrial release or subjected to harsher 
criminal justice outcomes without meaningful protection against 
government overreach.  
Beyond databases, interviews conducted in criminal custody also 
raise questions about probable cause determinations. DHS releases 
little information about how the interview process unfolds.306 The case 
of U.S citizen Davino Watson, who spent three-and-a-half years in 
immigration detention trying to establish his citizenship,307 reveals how 
front-end procedural protections might reduce the impact of 
inaccurate detainers. Watson was transferred to ICE custody after 
completing a felony criminal sentence.308 During his first interview with 
ICE, he explained his U.S. citizenship status.309 He also provided 
contact information for family members who could corroborate his 
claims.310 Had ICE officials checked his criminal court records, they 
would have found that his presentence report stated that Watson was 
 
 304.  Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1018 (C.D. Cal. 2019), rev’d in part, 975 F.3d 788 
(9th Cir. 2020).  
 305.  Gonzalez, 975 F.3d at 821 (“These categorical findings, however, suffer from a key 
shortcoming: the district court did not make reliability findings for all the databases on which ICE 
relies.”). The district court analyzed six databases in detail, but did not make findings about 
whether those databases were representative of errors in all the databases. Id. 
 306.  WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44627, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT: CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAMS 10 n.38 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
R44627.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4JA-96ZN] (“A person who enters without inspection and has 
had no previous contact with DHS often can only be identified as an unauthorized alien based on 
an interview with an experienced immigration officer.”).  
 307.  Watson v. United States, 865 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2017). The court aptly stated that 
“[i]t is arresting and disturbing that an American citizen was detained for years in immigration 
proceedings while facing deportation.” Id. at 127.  
 308.  Id. at 128. 
 309.  Id. at 127. 
 310.  Id. at 127–28. 
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a U.S. citizen and contained information for his family members.311 But 
no one contacted his family or checked his criminal court records.312 
Though Watson’s detention resulted in part from his requesting delays 
in immigration adjudication to try to secure counsel, adequate front-
end procedures could have avoided his prolonged detention in the first 
place.313  
Access to counsel and neutral review of probable cause 
determinations have the potential to safeguard a process that closely 
resembles criminal punishment in its effect. If immigration screening 
occurs in criminal custody, its front-end safeguards should more closely 
resemble those of criminal procedure. Local law enforcement agencies 
that carry out detainer requests should only do so after an independent 
determination that there is probable cause for an arrest.  
Expanded access to counsel at the time that an immigration 
detainer is lodged could also help surface errors more quickly. In the 
criminal justice system, indigent defense lawyers may lack immigration 
expertise. Once residents are placed in removal proceedings, they have 
no right to counsel at the government’s expense.314 A recent empirical 
study by Professors Ingrid Eagly and Steven Shafer found that looking 
at “individual removal cases decided on the merits . . . only 37% of 
immigrants had counsel during [their] study period from 2007 to 
2012.”315 Access to counsel in immigration court makes an enormous 
difference in outcomes in removal cases. Eagly and Shafer’s study of 
1.2 million immigration removal cases found that those in immigration 
custody who had counsel “obtained a successful outcome (i.e., case 
termination or relief) in 21% of cases, ten-and-a-half times greater than 
the 2% rate for their pro se counterparts.”316 Expanding access to 
counsel in immigration cases offers an important way to surface claims 
of factual and legal error.  
 
 311.  Id. at 128. 
 312.  Id. 
 313.  Id. at 142 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Michael 
Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J. 125, 163 (2015) 
(“Guarding against unintentional errors with grave human consequences is alone a good reason 
to add a neutral review early in the process.”). 
 314.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2018). 
 315.  Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration 
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015). 
 316.  Id. at 9. The study controlled for other variables that could affect case outcomes, 
“including detention status, nationality, prosecutorial charge type, fiscal year of decision, and 
jurisdiction of the immigration court.” Id. 
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As a general matter, jailhouse immigration screening requires 
rethinking criminal law and immigration law as distinct fields. In 
Padilla, the Court took this approach by holding that criminal defense 
attorneys must warn defendants if their guilty plea could trigger 
mandatory deportation.317 In extending Sixth Amendment obligations 
to immigration penalties, the Court recognized how deportation is 
“intimately related to the criminal process.”318 Immigration removal 
decisions are mediated through the criminal justice system. The 
interconnections between immigration law and criminal law do not 
only come into effect after a criminal conviction; they affect the very 
beginning of the criminal arrest process. A regulatory approach should 
recognize how merged immigration–criminal consequences are 
experienced, rather than treating immigration law and criminal law as 
distinct bodies of law that both happen to operate in the jailhouse.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that in order to recognize the reach of 
immigration enforcement, it is essential to focus on how the legal 
institution of the jailhouse affects immigration regulation. The 
rationale for jailhouse immigration screening is to target enforcement 
on noncitizens who fall within federal removal priorities. But in 
practice, jailhouse screening creates unjustified detention within the 
criminal legal system based on suspected civil immigration violations, 
imposes enormous hidden costs on racial minorities most likely to be 
subject to low-level criminal arrest, and ultimately creates systemic 
risks of removal without adequate regard to legal, procedural, or 
equitable considerations. Given the sheer size of the criminal justice 
system, jailhouse immigration screening massively expands the reach 
of immigration enforcement and creates new risks that racially biased 
domestic arrests will lead to removal. This approach should call into 
question the role that the criminal justice system plays in determining 
who belongs in the United States. At a time when there is widespread 
agreement that the criminal justice system is too big and that it 
disproportionately controls and punishes racial minorities, it is time to 




 317.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
 318.  Id. at 365.  
